Petition for Rehearing (Dec. 22, 1981)


No. 81-427

IN THE

SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES


OCTOBER TERM, 1981



GARRY DAVIS
								
								
					Petitioner

v.

DISTRICT DIRECTOR
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE
								
		Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia


PETITION FOR REHEARING

								
		Garry Davis
								
		Petitioner
								
	Pro Se

Address of Petitioner:
Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016


						



TABLE OF CONTENTS



								
		       Page

Table of Contents                                               
			 i 

Table of Authorities                                    
			ii

Grounds for Petition for
	Rehearing                                               
			 1

Argumentation                                           
			 1

Certificate of Good Faith                                       
			 9

Certificate of Service                                  
			10

Appendix                                                        
			1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES


Cases Cited:                                            
		       Page

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill,    
 U.S. 604, 550,281                                               
			   1

Buffington v. Day, Mass. 1871, 78
U.S. 124, 11 Wall, 124, 20 L. Ed. 122                   
			   4

Hickman v. Taylor, 327 U.S. 808, 328
U.S.  876, 329                                             
			   1

Lichter v. U.S., 334, U.S. 742,
1782, 1948                                                      
			   6

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat, 326,
or 14 U.S., p. 304, (1816)                                      
			   3
 
Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'r.,
3 Dall 91                                                       
			   6

Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635,
(1863), 170                                                     
			   6

Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 347                     
			   3

U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220                          
			   5

U.S. v. Williams, N.Y. 1904, 2 S.C. 119,
194 U.S. 295, 48 L Ed. 979                                      
			   4

Van Horne v. Dorrace, 1795, CC Pa.,
2 Dall 304, 310 1 L Ed. 391,
F Case No. 16857                                                
			   3

Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall, 231
p. 19.                                                          
			   6

Martin v. Mott, 12 Weat(or 25 U.S.)
p. 19.                                                          
			   6

OTHER
								
		       Page

Warren Burger, Chief Justice, S.C.                      
			   7

Wm. O. Douglas, Justice, S.C.                           
			   7

Constitutional Dictatorship
	C. Rossiter, 1948.                                      
			   5

Albert Einstein
	Letter to World Federalists                     
			   4

Robert J. Jackson
	Chief Prosecutor, Nuremberg War
	Crimes Tribunal.                                        
			   1

Thomas Jefferson
	Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of
	Taking Up Arms, 1775.                           
			   1

Modern Constitutional Law
	Chester J. Antieau, 1969.                               
			1,3

New York Times.                                                 
			   6

Nine Justices In Search of a Doctine
	Emerson, 1965.                                  
			   3

Presidential Power In A Nutshell
	Arthur S. Miller, 1977                          
			 2,5,6

The Charter & Judgment of the
	Nuremberg Tribunal.                             
			   1

Total War and the Constitution
	E. Corwin, 1946.                                        
			   5

United Nations' Secretary General.                      
			2,7
 
Earl Warren, Chief Justice, S.C.                                
			2,7

World Habeas Corpus
	Luis Kutner, 1968                                       
			1,5

GROUNDS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING:

	This petition for rehearing is intended to clarify 
arguments advanced in original petition for certiorari. 
Hickman v. Taylor,  327 U.S. 808, 328 U.S. 876, 329 U.S. 
495;Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 280 U.S. 604, 550, 
281.1 

	The underlying issue herein under review is that of 
ultimate sovereignty which the nation claims but which 
claim, in terms of world war, is both anachronistic and 
suicidal versus the sovereignty of an individual world 
citizen exercising inalienable human rights, 
representative of and speaking for all humankind.2 
	Petitioner respectfully submits that the instant case 
offers unique features permitting the Court to affirm its 
historic mandate, "Equal Justice Under Law", as well as its 
given constitutional prerogative as envisioned by the 
framer when confronted with an executive impotent to 
make peace by sanctioning once again the inalienable 
rights of the people, justly and democratically. exercised 
by your petitioner.3 

	The concept of expatriation when linked to 
statelessness as argued in the previous petition (p. ___) 
exposes a basic dichotomy in national law revealed by 
petitioner's alleged renunciation of nationality.  That 
dichotomy posits the inalienable sovereignty of the 
individual, the primary source of national " as well as 
local and state " law itself against the national sovereignty 
as an exclusive political fiction.4 
	The instant case dramatically focuses juridical attention 
on this dichotomy in a novel interpretation of the Ninth 
Amendment and is germane to the issue of war itself which 
petitioner seeks to clarify below.
	It would be absurd to argue that the exclusive character 
of the nation was absolute and eternal.  Such an argument 
would be a denial of the evolution of law itself from which 
resulted the United States Constitution " as all national 
constitutions " in the first place.5 
	The absence of a world government to which the 
petitioner could refer his prime civic commitment as a 
countervailing force to world war obliged him to divest 
himself of the national exclusive character which per se 
violated the principle of a planetary citizenship alone 
capable of coping with the global problems facing him.6
 

	Petitioner suggests that the implicit and historic 
advantage of the United States Constitution is contained in 
its provision for acts of individual sovereignty via the 9th 
and 10th amendments in situations arising from 
circumstances distinct from those which resulted in the 
constitution originally.6 
	Not to recognize this constitutional advantage would be 
to deny the essential unversality of the constitution itself 
as well as the innate and inalienable sovereignty of the 
people.  ("The theory of our political system is that the 
ultimate sovereignty is in the people from whom springs 
all legitimate authority."  McLean, J. in Spooner v. 
McConnell, 1. McLean, 347.)
	With respect to the framer's commitment to the 
amendment of "enumerated rights," (9th), petitioner 
respectfully suggests that the Court address the question:  
As citizenship itself is defined within the parameters of a 
civic code, are not the rights "retained by the people" 

natural or human rights existing outside the purview of 
that code, in this case the U.S. Constitution itself? 
(Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 1795, CC Pa., 2 Dall 304, 310 1 L Ed 
391, 394, F Cas No. 16857:  "The Supreme Court in 1793 said 
there were "natural, inherent and inalienable rights of 
man.."").
	Pertinent to this question, would not this reasoning be 
supported by the framers themselves who, bound civically 
by their separate state constitutions, nevertheless 
exercised sovereign rights outside those then exclusive 
legal frameworks in order to formulate, then codify in a 
document a new sovereignty which was innate and 
inalienable in the people themselves, distinct from that of 
the several states 8 , that of the United States of America?

	Pursuing this strictly constructionist line of argument, 
petitioner further inquires of the Court by what right this 
new and inclusive government was founded if civic rights 
were circumscribed on by the existing state codes?  Is not 
the answer self-evident " affirmed by the 9th and 10th 
amendments " that the people retained rights not codified 
and indeed uncodifiable by such codes, the major one 
being the right to choose a new political identity for the 
protection of those very rights?
	This Court, of course, cannot determine further that the 
founding fathers, in maintaining the sovereignty of the 
people via both the 9th and the 10th amendments, were 
condoning anarchy in recognizing rights beyond the 
Constitution's limits.  For it would then be denying due 
process per se.  Yet when the violations of human rights 
are perpetrated by the national government itself " as in 
the instant case and in myriad others throughout the 
world " as a person with legal standing before this High 
Court, petitioner has the right and duty to inquire by what 
legal process can such inalienable rights be protected?  
The question is not only germane to his personal situation, 
as described in the petition for certiorari, but to a host of 
global issues of which war " legitimized by the very 
nation-state system " is the central one.9 
	The paradox seems insoluble unless we admit to higher 
laws therefore uncodified by the nation, to which the 
people could refer.  In their judicial recognition of the 
limitations of the Constitution and retained powers of the 
people, the courts have referred obliquely to these laws:
The powers the people have given to the 
general government are named  in the 
Constitution, and all not there named, either 
expressly or by implication are reserved to 
the people and can be exercised only by them, 
or upon further grant from them. (Emphasis 
added). U.S. v. Williams, N.Y. 1904,2 S.C. 119, 
194 U.S. 295, 48 L Ed. 979.
	Such common laws, protecting fundamental human 
rights, existing outside and independent of national 
constitutional law, could only be worldly in character.  
They need not however be inconsistent with national or 
local law.  The relationship of the several states to the 
federal union is not irrelevant here:
The general government and the states, 
although both exist within the same 
territorial limits, are separate and distinct 
sovereignties, acting separately and 
independently of each other, within their 
respective spheres. Buffington v. Day, Mass. 
1871,78 U.S. 124, 11 Wall.  124, 20 L Ed. 122.
	This Court cannot but determine that these 
natural/human rights require legal protection since it 
itself is the juridical inheritor of the very constitutive 

process by which such protection was, until the advent of 
total war, afforded.  But, in that petitioner's 
natural/human rights are not only not protected by the 
United States sovereignty but indeed menaced by it " in 
the sense that the U.s. government has no legislative or 
judicial control over the actions of any other sovereign 
state, its so-called foreign policy therefore being 
essentially reactive, i.e. defensive " petitioner's right to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to name those 
inalienable rights enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence, are unsecured.
	This Court's grant of certiorari will not only confirm 
the mandate of the 9th and 10th amendments but will, at 
last, uphold the very constitutive process as the sine qua 
non of world peace.
	In other words, a world citizenship unprohibited and 
undenied by the U.S. constitution " as the state 
constitutions neither prohibited nor denied a national 
constitution " both recognizing and protecting 
inalienable human rights could be confirmed by this Court 
as not only the rightful political expression of popular 
sovereignty implied in both the 9th and 10th amendments, 
but the direct and substantive challenge to war-making 
itself at a moment when such judicial insight is 
desperately needed by a world of ready-to-explode nation-
states.  Today's very headlines starkly underline this 
imperative need.
	Contrarily, a denial of certiorari may be interpreted as 
confirming the infamous and contemptible dictum inter 
armes silent leges which has dominated the Court's history 
from its inception.10 
	To illustrate this charge, petitioner cites Justice 
Marshall's observation in 1803 th at
   By the constitution of the United States the 
President is vested with certain important 
political powers in the exercise of which he is 
to use his own discretion...and whatever 
opinion may be entertained at the manner in 
which executive discretion may be used, still 
there exists, and can exist, no power to 
control that discretion.11 
	How may the citizen view this "monarchical" power in 
view of Justice Samuel Miller's opinion in the U.S. v. Lee, 
106 U.S. 196, 220, 1882, that 
No man is so high that he is above the law.   
All...officers are creatures of the law and are 
bound to it?
	It is clear that the Constitution both defines the 
parameters of legitimacy while yet conferring on the 
President arbitrary powers in his capacity as Head of 
State " totally vitiating the concept and exercise of civic 
rights " placing him thereby "outside" those parameters.

	"In times of declared war," according to Arthur S. 
Miller, (Presidential Power In A Nutshell, p. 19), 

"particularly in the 20th century when wars have become 
planetary in extent, the President acts as a "constitutional 
dictator". There is a tacit understanding that nothing " 
literally nothing " will be permitted to block winning the 
war.   What is necessary, as determined by the executive, is 
done.  Legal niceties are given little attention.  National 
survival is the ultimate issue." (Emphasis added.)
	In short, "Judicial control of presidential action is next 
to nonexistent." (Ibid., p. 30)
	Yet, war to be legitimate, must be winnable.
	The war powers of Congress and the 
President are only those to be derived from 
the Constitution...the primary application of a 
war power is that it shall be an effective 
power to wage war successfully. (Emphasis 
added.) Lichter v. U.S., 334 U.S. 742, 782, 1948 
per Burton, J.
	Also, the war-making power must be accompanied by 
its opposite: peace-making power:
	The authority to make war of necessity 
implied the power to make peace, or the war 
must be perpetual... Ware v. Hylton,  3 Dall, 
231 per Chase, J. (See also Penhallow v. 
Doane's Adm'r., 3 Dall 91, remarks of Tredell, 
J.)
	Yet the U.S. President declared on October 21, 
1981:
	In a nuclear war, all mankind would 
lose.(New York Times, Oct. 22, 1981)
	This statement only confirms overwhelming 
evidence since 1945 of the totality of modern war, 
both conventional and nuclear.
	If indeed war is no longer winnable and its 
"end" is total annihilation, it can no longer be 
considered legitimate.
	The history of the discretionary powers of the 
U.S. President as Head of State is, of course, not at 
issue in the instant case.  Nonetheless, in his claim 
to recognition by this court as a world citizen 
following Judge Thomas Flannery's oblique 
recognition (See Memorandum and Opinion, District 
Court, p. 11), petitioner cannot but challenge 
incidentally such arbitrary power as a fundamental 
contradiction of the constitutional process itself.
	As Arthur Miller rightly contends, "...the United 
States has one Constitution for peacetime and 
another for wartime." (Presidential Power In A 
Nutshell, p. 184.) (See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 1863, 
Grier, J.;  also Martin v. Mott,  12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) p. 
19)
	As determined by the lower courts' decisions in 
agreement with the INS's determinations as to the 
petitioner's status plus this Court's denial to date of 
certiorari, he is likewise "outside" those parameters as is 
the U.S. President.  For as a person enjoying 
natural/human rights, does he not also enjoy 

"discretionary power" to represent his own sovereignty 
along with that of humankind per se?  And is not this 
Court's denial of certiorari tacit confirmation of that 
"discretionary power" which cannot but be inherent in 
the exercise of inalienable rights?             

	It goes without saying that, in the event of a nuclear 
war, when the nation is destroyed, as the U.S. President has 
advised us, this court will likewise cease to exist.  In the 
face of this ultimate threat to the nation, does not this 
Court have an imperative judicial obligation to utilize 
whatever powers it possesses constitutionally to avert such 
a catastrophe?  Or else the aspirations and sacrifices of the 
original framers and their descendants would have been 
in vain.
	Your petitioner, in standing before the bar of world 
public opinion for over thirty years as a world citizen, is 
evidently not alone in his quest for a peaceful world 
through just law.
	No less distinguished a jurist than former Chief Justice 
Earl Warren stated in 1954:
In these trouble times, the hope for a peaceful 
world is of a world based on law as distinct 
from a world based on authority...
	Then former Justice William O. Douglas reminded us in 
1958:
More and more people are coming to realize 
that peace is the product of law and order; 
that law is essential if the force of arms is not 
to rule the world.
	The present Chief Justice, in greeting the assembled 
jurists from over 100 nations at the 1975 World Peace 
Through Law Conference in Washington, stated in part:
	We agree that man was meant to be free 
and that a state should be the agent and 
servant of its people, not the master...We 
agree that the proceedings of justice and the 
search for peace are among the highest 
aspirations of human beings...We know that 
justice is indivisible; it recognizes no 
boundaries; it is not confined in concepts of 
geography or jurisdiction; it is not limited in 
terms of language, creed, or political 
doctrines.  It belongs to all who are now alive 
and to all those unborn who will follow us.  
(See Appendix for additional statements from 
Heads of State)

CONCLUSIONS

	Wherefore, in this universal spirit of "Equal Justice 
Under Law", which is a global rallying-cry for 
beleaguered humanity itself, Petitioner respectfully 
requests that this Court grant this Petition for Rehearing.

						Respectfully submitted,



						/s/Garry Davis
						Petitioner Pro Se


3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 2016

December 22, 1981

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

	Petitioner hereby certifies that the foregoing Petition 
for Rehearing, was 

submitted in good faith and not for purpose of delay.



							/s/ Garry Davis
							Petitioner-Pro Se
							3606 Ordway St., 
N.W.
							Washington, D.C. 
20016


Subscribed and sworn to before me

this __22nd__  day of December, 1981

at Washington, D.C.

(signature ?)
Notary Public



My  Commission Expires February 14, 1985

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

	I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies of the foregoing 
Petition for Rehearing were mailed by regular mail or 
delivered to JAMES P. MORRIS, Attorney, General Litigation 
and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, and ERIC A. 
FISHER, Attorney, Department of Justice, Criminal Division, 
Washington, D.C. 20530.

							/s/ Garry Davis
							Petitioner-Pro Se 

3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016

December, 1981

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543


								
	January 25, 1982

Mr. Garry Davis
3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016



			Re:     Garry Davis
				v. District Director, Immigration and
				Naturalization Service
				No. 81-427



Dear Mr. Davis:


	The Court today entered the following order in the 
above entitled 

case:

	The petition for rehearing is denied.


							Very truly yours,



							/s/Alexander L. 
Stevas, Clerk

NEWS RELEASE February 1, 1982

SUPREME COURT REFUSAL TO CONSIDER WORLD 
CITIZEN GARRY DAVIS' CASE VS. THE I.N.S. POSES 
PROBLEM FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT:  DEPORT HIM, 
DETAIN HIM OR FORGET HIM?

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The case of Garry Davis, which 
began actually when he stepped off the Pan Am plane at 
Dulles Airport on May 13, 1977, versus the U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service is seemingly closed.  Or is it?
	Legally, Davis is still stepping off that plane. On 
January 22, 1982, the Supreme Court denied Davis' last 
appeal for a hearing after having refused to grant him 
certiorari on October 9, 1981 to review lower court rulings.
	The Court's decision in effect confirms these rulings 
that the 60-year-old American-born Davis is an 
"excludable alien" as well as a "stateless person."  Now the 
INS has to legitimately exclude him.
	But to where?
	Unlike the Cubans, Haitians, Iranians, Ethiopians, 
Mexicans, Russians and numerous other nationalities now 
living legally or illegally in the United States, Davis, a U.S. 
bomber pilot in World War II, has no other country to 
which he can be "returned."
	In his petition for certiorari, he challenged both the 
law allowing expatriation and the law excluding him from 
his native land.  He claimed as well that the ninth 
amendment of the U.S. Constitution protected his 
inalienable rights to claim a new political identity in the 
face of an imminent world war between nation-states.
	Then, in his Petition for Rehearing, Davis challenged 
the U.S. president's discretionary powers which, he claims, 
can lead to world war, positing the discretionary powers of 
the citizen to "make peace" by raising the level of civic 
commitment to the global level.
	Ironically, he heads a District of Columbia-based 
corporation, the World Service Authority, which issues the 
very passport the INS refuses to recognize to individuals 
throughout the world who either have no national 
documents and cannot obtain them or whose national 
papers are invalid and cannot be renewed.
	The WSA was founded in 1954 as the administration 
agency of the world government declared by Davis on 
September 4, 1953 from Ellsworth, Maine. To date, over 
250,000 WSA documents have been issued, mostly to 
refugees and stateless persons.  They have been recognized 
on a case-by-case basis by over 60 nations according to 
WSA records.  These include, incredibly enough, the United 
States.
	"I have claimed for over thirty years," Davis said, "that 
the nation-state system was incapable of solving global 
problems.  President Reagan, in his State of the Union 
message, clearly confirmed this position.  He had no plan 
for world peace claiming only that military strength 
insures peace, a total denial of his own role as chief 
executor of the national law.  He even referred to George 
Washington who, as the nation's first president, 
symbolized the triumph of law over anarchy.  Then 
Reagan's so-called new federalism is a backward step 
without a new federalism extending to the world 
community itself.  National dictators fear above all the loss 
of their power-base, the nation-state.
	"In 1787, the founding fathers also proposed a "new 
federalism" of which President Reagan is the latest 
presidential inheritor.  But, ironically, Reagan has no 
plans for a world federation to protect the several nations 
and the world's people.  We, the world's people, must 
therefore take our destiny in our own hands."

	The World Government of World Citizens has registered 
over 100,000 citizens and has issued the world passport to 
Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and 
elsewhere, Eritreans in Saudi Arabia, Burmese, Vienamese 
and other southeast Asian refugees in Thailand, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, African refugees in the Sudan, Somalia, 
Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, etc., seamen with invalid 
national passports, and the tens of thousands of others 
who, for one reason or another, have problems with 
national travel documents.
	Since Davis has no other country to which he can be 
deported, the INS must either detain him permanently 
or...do nothing.  In that case, Davis will have in effect won 
his right to remain in the United States indefinitely.  The 
only question remains, what is his status?
	According to the law, he is not yet legally admitted.  
Therefore, he is not legally here.  Now the Supreme Court, 
which permitted him to petition it, therefore, obviously 
considered him a person before the law, has contrarily 
denied him a legal status in the United States.  Or, indeed, is 
its decision a tacit confirmation that Davis' "inalienable 
rights" can only be exercised by him as he claims and will 
neither be prohibited nor denied by the high court?
	The second question concerns his right to travel.  The 
INS will obviously not deny his right to leave the United 
States.  But what happens when he returns?  He still will be 
deportable according to the law.  Will the INS then detain 
him permanently or, as it has done since May 17, 1977, will 
it consider him a "free agent" continually getting off the 
plane but physically able to come and go as he pleases?
	If so, the World Citizen will have proved his case.

V
The U.S. Supreme Court and World Citizenship
A Postscript

	The U.S. Supreme Court, on October 19, 1981 and January 
25, 1982 respectively, denied both my petition for 
certiorari and Petition for Rehearing to be considered a 
legal world citizen in the United States.
	The decision has proved my thesis that my right to 
identify myself as a world citizen is indeed legal.
	How do I arrive at that seemingly extraordinary 
conclusion? First of all, since January 25, 1982, when the 
final court decision was published, the lower courts' 
decision " that I am an "excludable alien" as well as 
"stateless" " prevail according to U.S. law.  This in turn 
obliges the Immigration and Naturalization Service to  

"exclude" me from U.S. soil.
	In that the same INS contends that I am "stateless" and 
therefore unexcludable, it has failed to obey that U.S. law at 
this present writing.  (Other "excludable aliens", Haitians, 
Afghans, etc. remain in U.S. jails.)
	This conclusion, that the U.S. code was inoperable in my 
case, was part of my argument to the Supreme court.
	What then is my legal status in the United States?  In 
default of U.S. law assigning me a legitimate one, it can 
only be that which I myself claim.
	Secondly, in both petitions, I claimed that the Ninth 
Amendment " "The rights enumerated in the Constitution 
do not deny or disparage other rights retained by the 
people" " sanctions the exercise of the inalienable  
right to claim a new and higher political allegiance along 
with the existing ones.
	That is precisely what the founding Fathers did.  Why 
"founding"?  Why "fathers"?  The very two words connote 
a newly created entity.
	In denying my petitions, the high court in effect 
denied its jurisdiction in determining the nature of those 
rights "retained by the people" in that such rights, being 
inalienable, are thus anterior to the formulation of the 
Constitution itself and the founding of the Court.
	Thirdly, the Supreme Court upheld the long-standing 
principle that expatriation is a human right regardless 
of the consequences of statelessness.  
	That means, incidentally, that any Haitian, Ethiopian, 
Eritrean, Iraqian, Iranian, Mexican, Ghanaian, Nigerian, 
Russian, Israeli, Burmese, Vietnamese, etc. who arrives on 
U.S. shores by whatever route or means can unilaterally 
renounce his or her nationality " a registered letter is 
sufficient " return all state documents and the U.S. law 
must in turn respect that human right.
	In fact, this right is actually spelled out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15(2): 

"Everyone has the right to a nationality and everyone has 
the right to change his nationality."
	If we have the right to "change" our nationality, 
obviously we have the right to choose our own 
government.
	That is one of the inalienable rights implied in the 
Ninth Amendment.  The 1981 Human Rights Report of the 
U.S. State Department, confirms this revolutionary notion 
categorically: "Individuals do not owe their humanity to 
the community, as earlier philosophies often argued; the 
community owes its whole legitimacy to the 
individuals whose existence is prior to it." 
(Emphasis added)(p. 3, col. 2)
	Now comes the political bombshell. If the expatriate " 
or the national citizen " willfully chooses World 
Government as the object of his/her sovereign global 
allegiance as many are today doing in lieu of any 
other government to represent them at this 
highest and newest civic level, they have thus 
legalized themselves  in a revolutionary yet non-
violent and democratic way and in perfect conformity with 
both U.S. historical precedent and constitutional law!
	Now is the time once again to test my theory in the field 
of world action.
1/"Any constitutional society commits itself to certain values, and 
the United States by the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
is consciously dedicated to individual liberty, integrity, and 
equality, an open society, and the rule of law.  Of these values the 
Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian and trustee.
	Modern Constitutional Law, Chester J. Antieau, Vol. 1 V 
(1969) The Lawyer Co-   Operative Publishing Co.
2/"...a reverence for our great Creator, principles of humanity, and 
the dictates of conscience, must convince all those who reflect upon 
the subject that government was instituted to promote the welfare of 
mankind and ought to be administered for the attainment of that 
end."

	Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of the Causes and Necessity 
of Taking Up Arms, Continental Congress, 1775.
"...the very essence of the charter (Charter of the Tribunal, 
Nuremberg) is that individuals have international duties which 
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the 
individual state.  He who violates the laws of war can not obtain 
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if 
the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under 
international law."
	The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1949 (See 
Office of United States Chief of Counsel of Prosecution of Axis 
Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and 
Judgment, Government Printing Office, 1947)
	"Any method of maintaining international peace today must 
eventually fail if it is not grounded on Justice under Law and the 
protection of the Individual under due process of law."
	World Habeas Corpus, Luis Kutner, 1968, p. 73
3/"Let it be stated again that the generation that gave us the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution believed solidly in 
the doctrine of natural rights.  They understood that the purpose of 
government was to protect men in their basic, natural rights, and 
they were sure that they could hold their own state governments to 
this end."
	Modern Constitutional Law, Chester J. Antieau, p. 676 
	"International Law is more than a scholarly collection of 
abstract and immutable principles.  It is an outgrowth of treaties 
and agreements between nations of accepted customs.  Yet every 
custom has its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to 
be initiated by the action of some state.  Unless we are prepared to 
abandon every principle of growth for international law, we cannot 
deny that our own day has the right to initiate customs and to 
conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer 
and strengthened international law..."
	Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg war crime trials, 1945; J.S.C.
4/ "Since under the express terms of the constitution, there is no 
one political sovereign — other than  the ill-formed notion of 

"popular sovereignty", which are taken seriously only as slogans but 
not as descriptions of reality — the theoretical problem of 
sovereignty in the United States has not yet been fully resolved."
	Presidential Power In A Nutshell,  Arthur S. Miller, West 
Publishing Co., 1977
5/"A Constitution designed to endure for the ages to come must 
perforce bend with the winds of social change."
	Ibid. p. 67
   "Each generation writes its own constitution, just as each 
generation writes its own history."
	Ibid. p. 67
   "Constitutional law in essence is politics writ large; and 
government is always relative to circumstances."
	Ibid. p. 67
   The only intention of the Founding Fathers worth serious 
attention today is that they left the tasks of governance to the good 
sense and wisdom of succeeding generations of Americans."

	Ibid. p. 66
   "Government can be safely acknowledged a temporal blessing 
because, in terms of the power it wields, there is nothing inherent 
in it.  Government is not an end in itself but a means to an end.  Its 
authority is the free and revocable grant of the men who have 
promised conditionally to submit to it.  Its organs, however ancient 
and august, are instruments that free men have built and free men 
can alter or even abolish."
	Earl Warren, C.J., S.C.

6/ The United Nations Secretary-General, in his supplementary 
Report to the General Assembly of 24 October 1946 stated that "In 
the interests of peace, and in order to protect mankind against 
future wars, it will be of decisive significance to have the 
principles which were implied in the Nuremberg trials (II. 
Jurisdiction and General Principles, Article 6(a)(b) and (c) which 
defines "crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for 
which there shall be individual responsibility"), and according to 
which the German war criminals were sentenced, made a permanent 
part of the body of international laws as quickly as possible.  From 
now on the instigators of new wars must know that there exists both 
law and punishment for their crimes.  Here we have a high 
inspiration to go forward and begin the task of working toward a 
revitalized system of international law."
   On 15 November 1946, the U.S. delegation introduced a proposal 
to the U.N. "...to initiate studies and make recommendations for the 
purpose of encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification..." and reaffirmed "...the 
principle of international law recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the tribunal."

   U.N. General Assembly Resolution 488 48(v) 1950,"Nuremberg 
Trials", entered the priniples to international law.
   The right to assume individual civic responsibility in a given 
community is the essence of course of the democratic principle and 
the true meaning of sovereignty.  This has been subseuently 
confirmed byArt.1,2,3,6,7,15(2),18,19 and 29 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
7/ "The Government of the United States can claim no powers which 
are not granted it by the constitution; and the powers actually 
granted must be such as are expressly given or given by necessary 
implication."
	Per Marshall, C.J., Martin v. Hunter's Lesse, 1 Wheat. 
326,(from Virginia Ct.) (1816)
   "Mr. Justice Douglas' use of the ninth amendment carries a 
greater potential.  Under his theory, the ninth amendment might be 
utilized to expand the concept of privacy or, perhaps, to guarantee 
other basic rights." (Emerson)
	Nine Justices In Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 
227 (1965) (See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-39 (1971) 
(Douglas, J. dissenting).  (See B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth 
Amendment,  (1955); Dunbar,  James Madison and the Ninth 
Amendment, 42  Va. L. Rev. 627 (1956); Kelley, The Uncertain 
Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 814 (1966); 
Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,  11 Ind. 
L.J. 309 (1936); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The 
"Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 Marq. L. Rev. 121 (1967); 
Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of 
Guarantee,  60 Cornell L. Rev. 231 (1975); Ringold,The History of 
the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development,  
8 Tulsa L.J. 1 (1972); Rogge,  Unenumerated Rights, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 
787 (1959)
8/ "At the time the Articles of Confederation were adopted the 
overwhelming majority of Americans accepted the doctrine of 
natural rights.  all men possessed certain basic, fundamental rights 
which government could not deny. Government was organized to 
protect and safeguard these rights.  It was the unspoken assumption 
in the Continental Congress that no state could ever justifiably 
deny to its own citizens their natural rights.  It was unthinkable 
that the possessors of political power needed he protection of the 
Articles of Confederation against their temporary trustees of 
governance..."  (Emphasis added.)
	Modern Constitutional Law, Chester J. Antieau, Vol. 1, v. 
(1969) p. 673
9/ "Material progress in total destructive explosive weapons has 
yielded the conclusion that the right to individual security is the 
pre-requisite of all other human rights and freedoms. collective 
individual security can be protected only under the Rule of Law and 
in the mainstream of Due Process of law.
	World Habeas Corpus<  Luis Kutner, 1962, p. 71
   "As long as their are sovereign nations possessing great power, 
war is inevitable.  There is no salvation for civilization, or even the 
human race, other hand the creation f a world government."

	Albert Einstein, Letter to World Federalists, Stockholm 
Congress, 1949.  
10/ "The judicial attitude is more than abstention; it verges at 
times upon courts being an arm of the executive when violence, 
foreign  or domestic, erupts."
	Presidential Power In A Nutshell, Arthur S. Miller, p. 163, 
(See also A  Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone, 
	Pillar of the Law, 1958)
11/ "It requires no special prescience to forecast that 
should a thermonuclear war erupt the Present and his 
subordinates will do whatever they think is necessary to 
maximum the national interest, without regard to the 
Constitution, the Congress or the Courts."
	Cf. El Corwin, Total War and the  Constitution, 1946; C. 
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948.
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