Petition For Writ of Certiorari

(August 28, 1981)

No. 81-428

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1981

GARRY DAVIS
Petitioner

DISTRICT DIRECTOR
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE
Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Address of Petitioner:                                  Garry Davis
Ordway Street, N.W.                                     Petitioner Pro Se
Washington, D.C. 20016
364-0871









p.149
QUESTIONS         PRESENTED             FOR                     REVIEW


	Whether 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20) is applicable to a native-born American who 
"expatriated" himself in accordance with 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5), thus becoming 
"stateless," who does not acquire another nationality and subsequently returns to 
the United States claiming it his permanent home.

	Whether 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5), resulting in "statelessness", was the intent of 
Congress both in conception and adoption of the legislation and if so, whether 
such "expatriation" is constitutional in that it condones a condition of anarchy.

	Whether the enabling statute of 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(20) is validly constructed 
and, if not, can a United States citizen legally "expatriate" himself according to 
the construction.

	Whether the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution can be 
construed as sanctioning the individual to exercise his natural and unalienable 
right to claim a citizenship transcending that of the nation in accordance with 
the concept of multiple citizenship enshrined in the Tenth Amendment. 





















p. 150

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW...........................................................................(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................(ii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................(iii)

OPINIONS BELOW................................................................................................................1

JURISDICTION.....................................................................................................................1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.....................................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................................3

ARGUMENT........................................................................................................................4

EXPATRIATION ALONE PRODUCES "STATELESSNESS", A CONDITION DEPRIVING THE 
INDIVIDUAL OF ALL POSITIVE RIGHTS.  THIS IN TURN PRODUCES THE ANOMALY OF 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY VS. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS.  THE INSTANT CASE REVEALS THE 
ANOMALY, POSITING IMMIGRATION LAWS AGAINST THE RIGHT OF A NATIVE-BORN 
"EXPATRIATE" TO LIVE IN HIS NATIVE LAND................................4

EXPATRIATION CANNOT BE EXECUTED THROUGH ENABLING LEGISLATION SINCE IT 
CANNOT LEGALLY BE EXECUTED IN A "FOREIGN STATE" NOR IN THE EXPATRIATING 
STATE.  AN EMBASSY IS NOT A "FOREIGN STATE."  YET 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5) MUST BE 
PERFORMED "BEFORE A DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR OFFICER IN A FOREIGN STATE."  
IF PERFORMED IN THE EXPATRIATING STATE, THE "EXPATRIATED" INDIVIDUAL 
COULD NOT LEAVE OR BE DEPORTED UNLESS HE HAD PERMISSION OF ENTRY FROM 
ANOTHER STATE............................................................4

BOTH THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
ACKNOWLEDGE RIGHTS RETAINED "BY THE PEOPLE."  IF THE EXPATRIATING 
INDIVIDUAL POSSESSES NO OTHER NATIONALITY NOR ADCQUIRES ONE GIVEN 
PRESENT STATUTES. THESE RIGHTS MUST BE EXERCISED BY INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED 
FOR PROTECTION OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND SUBSEQUENT RIGHTS.  THIS 
EXERCISE OF RIGHTS IS BOTH ANTERIOR TO AND INDEPENDENT OF THE NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.  ITS POLITICAL COROLLARY IS A NEW CITIZENSHIP 
OF A GLOBAL CHARACTER,  HUMAN RIGHTS BEING UNIVERSAL, IDENTIFYING BOTH 
THE INCLUSIVE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMANKIND AND THE UNALIENABLE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE IDIVIDUAL____________________9

CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................15









p. 151                                          ii

 





APPENDIX:

Full Statement of Petitioner, May 25, 1948.................................................................1a

Judgment Memorandum, Garry Davis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
No. 80-1071 (decided March 31, 1981), United States Court of appeals for the District 
of Columbia.................................................................................................1b

Memorandum Opinion and Order, ibid, No. 79-1874 (decided December 19, 1979), 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.........................................1c

Order denying petition for an order extending time for filing for a rehearing 
enbanc, ibid, No. 80-1071, (decided August 5, 1981), United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia...........................................................................1d

Order extending time to file a petition for writ of certiorari, ibid, No. A-1089, dated 
July 1, 1981, Supreme Court of the United States............................................1e

Official letters of national governments to the World Service Authority..........1f

Photostats of entry visa affixed on World Service Authority passports..............1g


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Afroyim v. Rusk,
	387 U.S. 253 (1967).....................................................................................................11

Axley v. Hammock,
	50 S.W. (2nd) 608, 185 Ark. 939.................................................................................1

Bezat v. Home Owners Loan Corp.,
	98 P 22 852, 855, 55 Ariz 85.........................................................................................6

Briesnick v. Dimond,
	142 S.E. 118, 165 Ga 780 dismissing
	cert. 134 S.E. 350 35 Ga App. 668................................................................................1

Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia
	30 U.S. 1, 15, 5...............................................................................................................6

Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Case,
	380 P2d 34, 151 Colo. 230...........................................................................................13


p.152                                           iii





Cowell v. State of Texas,
	16 Tex. App. 57, 61.......................................................................................................6

Faber v. United States,
	157 F 140, 141................................................................................................................6

Frazier v. Moffatt,
	239 P2d 123, 108 CA 2d 379........................................................................................7

Hilton v. Guyot,
	N.Y. 1895, 16 S. Ct. 139, 159 US 163............................................................................7

Hichino Uyeno v. Acheson,
	D.C. Wash., 96 F Supp. 510, 515................................................................................11

Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
	441 F. 2d 1245 (5 Cir. 1971)
	cert. den. 404 U.S. 946 (1971) ....................................................................................5

Kletter v. Dulles,
	D.C. 1953, III F Supp. 593............................................................................................6

Kuniyuki v. Acheson,
	D.C. Wash. 94 F. Supp.358, 360....................................................................................6

Ling Yee Suey v. Spar,
	CC A.N.Y. 1945 149 F. 2d 881......................................................................................12

Mack v. District Court of 2nd Jud. dist.
	in and for Washoe County, Dept. No.
	2m 258 p. 289, 50 Nev. 318..........................................................................................1

Marcia-Nir v. Smith,
	C81-1084A, D.C. Atlanta, GA........................................................................................6

People v. Pierce,
	41 N.Y.S. 858, 860, 18 Misc. 83....................................................................................7

Trop v. Dulles,
	365 US 86, 102.......................................................................................................10, 12

United States v. Cook,
	(decided 1970) 311 F. Supp. 618...............................................................................13





p. 153                                                  iv


United States Constitution, Statutes:

Ninth Amendment, The Constitution................................................................1, 12, 13, 14

Tenth Amendment, The Constitution..................................................................................1

Title 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5)................................................................................................5, 9, 11

Title 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20)........................................................................................................5

Title 8 U.S.C. 1252.....................................................................................................................4

Title 8 U.S.C. 1101(30)..............................................................................................................6

Title 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)...............................................................................................................6

Title 8 U.S.C. 292.......................................................................................................................6

Other:

A Study of Statelessness,
	139, 1949, United Nations Doc..........................................................................................8

Act of July 27, 1868,
	Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223...........................................................................................................9

Brief, Appellee, U.S. Court of Appeals.............................................................................3, 8

Chief Justice Earl Warren.............................................................................................10, 12

Declaration of Independence.........................................................................................2, 19

Expulsion des Heimatlos,
	60 Journal de Droit International,
	1161, 1177, 1933..................................................................................................................7

Convention of the Reduction of Statelessness, August 30, 1961, Art. 7(1).................10

Human Rights and World Public Order,
	957, MacDougal, Lasswell, Chen, Yale University Press, 1980................8, 10, 11, 13

Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law.....................................10

Thomas Jefferson..................................................................................................................11

The Anatomy of Peace
	38, Emery Reves, Harpers, 1945......................................................................................2

The Political Thought of the American Revolution
	222 Clinton Rossiter, Harcourt, 1953.............................................................................3

p 154                                           v
Third Report on the elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, U.N. Doc. ...............10

Sir John Fischer Williams, Denationalization, 8 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 47........................10

Transcript of Hearing, Exclusion Proceedings, May 17, 1977........................................3

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble,
	arts. 13(2), 21(3), 28.............................................................................................2, 11, 12













































p. 155                                                  vi


OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion for which review is sought here is the opinion of the united States 
Court of appeals for the district of Columbia Circuit in Dalvis v. INS, Case No. 80-
1071, decided on March 31, 1981, and is set forth in the attached Appendix (App.) B 
at page 1b.  The opinion of the United States District Court for the district of 
Columbia in the same case (C.A. No. 79-1874, filed December 19, 1979), is set forth at 
App. C, p. 1c.

JURISDICTION

A timely petition for rehearing en banc filed in the U.S. Court of 
appeals for the district of Columbia was denied August 5, 1981. The 
instant petition for certiorari is authorized to be filed on or before 
August 28, 1981 by No. 1254 of title 28, U.S.C. and in accordance with 
an Order of July 1, 1981 granting an extension of time for filing.
	The petitioner also claims the right of certiorari on the basis 
of:
1. "Three requisites for issuance of ‘certiorari’ are excess of 
jurisdiction, absence of appeal, and non-existence of another 
remedy."  Mack v. District Court of 2nd Judicial in and for Washoe 
County, Dept. No. 2m 258 p. 289, 50 Nev. 318.
2. "Discretion of court on petition for writ of certiorari requires 
court to act according to its judgment and conscience, and it involves 
fair consideration of all peculiar features of particular questions 
involved."  Axle v. Hammock, 50 S.W. (2nd) 608, 185, Ark. 939.
3. "Certiorari, to be justifiably granted, requires petition to raise 
issue of law of gravity and importance."  Briesnick v. Dimond,  142 S.E. 
118, 165 Ga 780 dismissing cert. 134 S.E. 350 35 Ga App. 668.


CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES


The Ninth Amendment provides:
	"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be 
	construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people."
The Tenth Amendment provides:
	"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
	prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
	to the people."
Title 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5) provides:
	"From and after the effective date of this Act, a person who is a national 	of 
	the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his 
	nationality by *******
		(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a                
		diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign        
		state in such form as may be described by the Secretary of State."



p. 156                                          -1-     
Title 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20) provides:
	"...any immigrant who at the time of application for admission is not in 
	possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border 
	crossing identification card, or other valid entry document required by 
	this chapter, and a valid unexpired passport or other suitable travel
	document, or document of identity and nationality...(is excludable)."

Title 8 1101(30) provides:
	"The term ‘passport’ means any travel document issued by a competent 
	authority showing the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality, if any, 
	which is valid for entry of the bearer into a foreign country."
also
Title 28, U.S.C. 1254
Title 8, U.S.C. 1252
Title 8, U.S.C. 1101(g)
Title 22, U.S.C. 292

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

	The petitioner, born in Bar Harbor, Maine, a World War II bomber pilot, 
became convinced in 1947 that exclusive nationality could no longer guarantee 
either himself, his native country or the world the fundamental rights of "Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."1
	A new social and political compact, he concluded, of a global character was 
essential in order to provide the institutions required to outlaw war between 
nations.2
	In a worldly sense, he considered himself in a "state of nature" in 
relationship to his fellow humans which had to be transformed by a willful 
exercise of natural rights into positive world law. 3
	The only form available to him to divest himself of exclusive nationality was 
8 U.S.C. 1841(a)(5) permitting willful and voluntary renunciation of nationality.  
Before a consular officer in the U.S. Embassy in  Paris, he availed himself of this 
provision.  Thus, in the terms implicitly defined by that Act, he became 
"stateless."4  
??
1/Declaration of Independence.
2/"Wars between groups of men forming social units always take place when these units—
tribes, dynasties, churches, cities, nation——exercise unrestricted sovereign power. Wars 
between these social units cease the moment sovereign power is transferred from them to a 
larger or higher unit." Anatomy of Peace, 38, Emery Reves, Harpers, 1945.
3/"Whereas it is essential if man is not compelled to have recourse as a last resort to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression that human rights should be protected by the rule of 
law..." Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Document.
	"Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."  Art. 28, ibid.
4/"Being without a state or without nationality..."  Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 
1959.                                                                   



157                                             2
	At the same time, he set forth the reasons for this act of alleged 
renunciation. They were briefly, 1) to renounce national exclusivity since its 
perpetuation colluded with international anarchy, and 2) to identify himself as a 
partner with his fellow humans in a new compact he called "world citizenship."5
	As an alleged stateless person, he as thenceforth been without or has had 
minimal rights or protection since 1948 from the various nations in which he 
found temporary residence.  He has been incarcerated over 20 times in 8 Western 
democracies for the "crime" of not possessing "valid" identity papers.  On two 
occasions, in 1950 and 1957, on seeking advice from U.S. consular officers abroad 
on how to return to his homeland, he was asked to "immigrate."  On both occasions 
he noted his permanent address as the United States.  The anomaly of 
"immigrating" to his home went unquestioned by either the consular officers, 
the State Department or the INS.
	On July 27, 1953, he was forcibly brought into the United States against his 
will — while aboard the S.S. Queen Mary docked at New York — by Immigration 
officials.6
	In order to protect his and other world citizens' rights against violation by 
national officials, on September 4, 1953 at Ellsworth, Maine, he declared a world 
government based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  In January, 
1954, in New York, he founded the World Service Authority as the administrative 
agency of the new government.
	On January 11, 1957, after his World Passport had been inspected by 
Immigration officials while he was still aboard a KLM plane at Kennedy Airport, 
he was permitted to enter the United States "without conditions"7 
	In June, 1975, petitioner entered the United States again identified only with 
the World Passport issued by the World Service authority in Basel, Switzerland.8    
At Kennedy Airport, petitioner was granted a waiver of the visa requirements by 
Immigration officials.9    He departed from the United States in September, 1975.  
He returned again in April, 1975 to attend his father's memorial service.  Again, at 
Kennedy Airport, Immigration officials waived the visa requirements after 
inspecting his World Service Authority passport.10 10
	On May 13, 1977, he again returned to the United States via Dulles Airport.  
As before, his only identification was the World Service Authority passport which 
stated that his home address was "1803  19th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C." 
	After two hearings, May 17, 1977 before Immigration Judge Emil M. Bobek, 
and Sept. 27, 1977 before the Board of Immigration Appeals, petitioner was 
declared 1) an "excludable alien," and 2) a "stateless person."
____________________
5/Full statement, Appendix 1a
	"Whatever rights or attributes of sovereignty government may exercise are the free and 
revocable grants of the people..." The Political Thought of the American Revolution, 222 
Clinton Rossiter, Harcourt, 1963.
6/See Transcript of Hearing, p. 14-15, A7 449 011, Exclusion Proceedings, May 17, 1977, INS. 
7/See Transcript of Hearings, p. 11-12, Exclusion Proceedings, May 17, 1977, INS. 
(Immigration officials subsequently claimed petitioned was "paroled" into U.S.)
8/The passport states it represents Art. 13, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that WSA 
is a global government administrative agency.
9/See Brief of Appellee, U.S. Court of appeals, p. 6.
10/See Transcript of Hearings, p. 20, Exclusion Proceedings, May 17, 1977, INS.


p. 158                                          3
	Despite the determination, the INS took no appropriate action as provided for 
in Title 8 U.S.C. 1252, "Apprehension and deportation of aliens-- Arrest and 
custody;  review of determination by court," with regard to the petitioner.11 
	On July 17, 1979, petitioner petitioned the United States District Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  (Civil Action No. 79-1874).  In a Memorandum Opinion of 
December 19, 1979, Judge Thomas Flannery presiding, petition was denied.  (App. 
B).
	On May 17, 1980,  petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit.  On March 31, 1981, appeal was denied in a 
Judgment with a Memorandum attached.  (App. C).
	On June 25, 1981, petitioner petitioned for Order Extending Time for Filing for 
a Rehearing En Banc, Time Having Expired, to the United States Court of appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit.
	The petition was denied on August 5, 1981.  (App. D).

					ARGUMENT
						I
EXPATRIATION ALONE PRODUCES "STATELESSNESS", A 
CONDITION DEPRIVING THE INDIVIDUAL OF ALL POSITIVE 
RIGHTS.  THIS IN TURN PRODUCES THE ANOMALY OF 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY, 
OR STATE LAWS/DECREES VS. HUMAN RIGHTS.  THE 
INSTANT CASE REVEALS THE ANOMALY POSITING 
IMMIGRATION LAWS AGAINST THE RIGHT OF A NATIVE- 
BORN "EXPATRIATE" TO LIVE IN HIS NATIVE LAND.

	 Neither the District Court nor the Appeals Court considered this anomalous, 
thus intolerable for the individual concerned, situation.
	
	a.  The District Court Judgment defined the instant case as presenting "the 
issue whether a native born American may renounce primary allegiance to the 
United States and still retain rights to enter and remain in this country without a 
proper visa."12 
	The full weight of the judgment therefore rested upon the "fact" of 
expatriation rather than 1) whether rights were retained in spite of the alleged 
renunciation,  2) what anomalies pertained which became manifest only after the 
expatriating act as exposed in the instant case, 3) whether the Act itself 
permitting expatriation could be performed in view of the construction of the 
statute, and 4) whether the concept of multiple citizenship was relevant in view 
of petitioner's express declaration of world citizenship.
______________________
11   The last embarkation point from which petitioner arrived on May 13, 1977 was Heathrow 
Airport, UK.  In that the British Home Office had already imprisoned petitioner for 12 weeks 
in 1953 as a "menace to the public good," arranging for his deportation in collusion with U.S. 
Immigration, he could not be returned to the UK.
12   Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1st p. (App. C).






p. 159                                                  4
	The Court of Appeals, in upholding the lower court's finding, inferred that 
petitioner could acquire "lawful permanent resident status..." as an "alien," and 
further, that his "laudable military record could qualify him for 
naturalization."13 
	The "solutions" of "acquiring permanent resident status" as an "alien" or 
"naturalization" were not at issue either in petitioner's petition to the lower court 
or in his appeal petition.      
	In short, he does not, nor has he ever considered himself an "alien" to his 
native land.  The incongruity of a natural-born American applying for 
naturalization did not bother the Appeal Court.
	The respondent, in both trials, sought only to prove that petitioner did 
renounce his nationality, was therefore an "alien," and thus could only re-enter 
the United States with a "proper visa."
	Thus, neither the District Court nor the Court of appeals addressed directly 
the contradiction inherent in the statutes, 8 U.S.C. 1841(a)(5) and 8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(2) when allied together as in the instant case.  Petitioner in brief cannot 
be removed from the United States despite the statute, as, for example, in Jolley v. 
INS,  441 F. 2d 1245 (5 Cir. 1971).

	b.  The lower court Memorandum claimed that petitioner had "at various 
times entered the United States on a permanent resident alien. . .visa" (p. 2, para. 
3).  This is in error.  The result of the "immigration" (See Statement of the Case, p. 
7-8) was to be classified by the INS  as a "permanent resident alien."  The entries 
to the United States, with one exception, were permitted by the INS  after waiving 
the visa requirements as outlined in the Statement of the Case herein.

	c.  The District Court Judgment further states that the Immigration Appeal 
Board "relying on 8 USC 1182(a)(20), found the petitioner excludable because he 
lacked a valid document of entry."  (Page 3, para. 1).

	In a subsequent section (II, p. 9), Judge Flannery states that "An alien must 
possess a proper entry document upon entering the United States."  Quoting 8 USC 
1182(a)(20) as his authority, he concluded that "The petitioner's World Service 
Authority Passport fails to qualify as one of the documents required by 8 USC 
1182."
	As previously noted, petitioner entered the United States on three separate 
occasions identified only with his World Service Authority Passport.  Counsel for 
respondent in his appeal brief stated that "Davis has chosen to place himself 
above the law and seek entry into the United States with simply a document of his 
own creation-- a World Service Authority passport."  (Page 16, para. 1).  
Respondent failed to deny, however, petitioner's entries on "a document of his 
own creation" with full cognizance and approval of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.
________________________
13   See Memorandum, App. 2b.







p. 160                                          5
	In accordance with the requirements of 8 USC 1101(30), petitioner herewith 
submits 1) photocopies of official national governmental letters in recognition of 
the World Service Authority Passport, and 2) various Photostatted entry visas of 
national governments-- including that of the United States-- affixed to WSA 
Passports as evidence that said passport "is valid for the entry of the bearer into a 
foreign country."  (App. F and G).

	d.  Judge Flannery's final admonition (page 11) "that any person who desires 
to pursue this goal (to work for world peace through the vehicle of world 
citizenship and world government) while residing in the United States. . .must 
obey this nation's immigration and naturalization laws."

	The INS, however, has no statutory authority to oblige petitioner to accept 
the status of a "permanent resident alien," or an "immigrant," or indeed any other 
status.  It can either accept or exclude individuals in accordance with prescribed 
statutes.14  
	In conclusion, should an individual, as in the instant case, be a victim of 
mutually contradictory statutes, how can he "obey this nation's immigration and 
naturalization laws" when the INS itself finds itself unable to enforce them?
						II
EXPATRIATION CANNOT BE EXECUTED THROUGH ENABLING 
LEGISLATION SINCE IT CANNOT LEGALLY BE PERFORMED "IN A 
FOREIGN STATE."  YET  8 USC 1481(a)(5) MUST BE PERFORMED 
"BEFORE A DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR OFFICER IN A FOREIGN 
STATE."  IF PERFORMED IN THE EXPATRIATING STATE, THE 
"EXPATRIATED" INDIVIDUAL COULD NOT LEAVE OR BE DEPORTED 
UNLESS HE HAD PERMISSION OF ENTRY FROM ANOTHER STATE.

      The petitioner did not expatriate himself "in a foreign state."15  He took the
____________________
14/The aforementioned forced entry-- July 27, 1953-- illustrates in an ominous way the 
frustrations of both the executive and judicial branches of the government in trying to 
reconcile the inconsistencies represented by the statutes here in question.  For instance, 
should petitioner depart from the United States-- "deporting" himself (See 8 USC 1101(g)) and 
return, will the INS take him into arbitrary custody (See Marcia-Nir v. Smith, C81-1084A, 
D.C. Atlanta) , waive the visa requirements or as now again "exclude" him legally if not 
actually?
15/"A 'foreign state' with former section 17 of this title...providing for expatriation of 
American citizen who was naturalized under laws of foreign state was a country which was not 
the United States or its possessions or colony, an alien country, other than our own."  Kletter 
v. Dulles, D.C. D.C. 1953, III F,Supp. 593,.  "In act providing for loss of United States 
nationality by participation in political election in 'foreign state' quoted words are not word 
of art, and in using them Congress did not have in mind fine distinctions as to sovereignty of 
occupied and unoccupied countries which authorities on international law may have 
formulated, but when Congress speaks of 'foreign state' it means a 'country' which is not the 
United States or its possession or colony,  'an alien country', 'other than our own'...."  Hichino 
Uyeno v. Acheson,  D.C. Wash. 96 F.Supp. 510, 515.  (See also Bigley v. New York & P.R.S.S. Co., 
1 05 F. 74, 76;  Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 521, 10 AM Dec. 179;  Cherokee Nation v. 
State of Georgia, 30 US 1, 15, 5  Pet. 1, 15, 88 Ed. 25;  Cowell v. State, 16 Tex, App. 57, 61;  
Faber v. United States, 157 F. 140, 141;  Bezat v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 98 P.2d 852, 855, 
55 Ariz.;  Kuniyuki v. Acheson, D.C. Wash., 94 F.Supp. 358, 360).                               
p. 161                                                  6
Oath of Renunciation on United States territory or "soil."  The embassy of any 
nation-state rests on territory belonging to the nation represented by the 
embassy.16  
	A diplomatic or consular officer, administering any oath to any national 
citizen, does so within the confines of that sovereign territory.  He is not, 
consequently, "in a foreign state."  The issue here is not superficial but 
substantive, involving diplomatic relations between sovereign nations as well as 
the very existence of states themselves occupying specific sections of the 
planet.16a  Only in the recognition of territorial sovereignty, of which the 
embassies are an integral part, can nations enjoy diplomatic relationships with 
each other or indeed even exist as such.17 
	This principle is recognized universally, and, as part of customary 
international law, is respected reciprocally by all nation-states.18 
	Therefore, for a United States citizen to "expatriate" himself, according to the 
statute, he must be both "before a diplomatic or consular officer..." and   "...in a 
foreign state."  This construction is not merely clumsy and irresponsible but 
deceptive and essentially inoperable.
	The deception comes directly [when] the individual has become an alleged 
expatriate.  He is then  obliged to enter  a foreign state.  Theoretically and actually 
he should remain in the U.S. Embassy unless he already possesses another 
nationality and, therefore, presumably another passport.  For to enter a "foreign 
state" without "valid" entry papers is as much a "crime" as to enter the United 
States illegally.
	Yet, by permitting the Oath of Renunciation to be taken under the "cover" of 
an Embassy, away from the prying eyes of a "foreign state," the U.S. Congress is 
condoning and even abetting the post facto act of illegal entry.
	The construction thus of the statute enabling expatriation is manifestly 
contradictory, unworkable and, in terms of "foreign" relations, inadmissible.19 
__________________
16/22 USC 292 provides:
"Acquisition of sites and buildings for diplomatic and consular establishments:  (a)  The Secretary of 
State is empowered to acquire...any building or grounds of the United States  in foreign countries and 
under the jurisdiction  and control of the Secretary of State ...for the use of the diplomatic and 
consular establishments of the United States."  (Emphasis added)
	"Jurisdiction is authority of law to act officially in particular matter in hand."  Frazier v. Moffatt, 
239 P 2d 123 108 CA 2d 379.
	"Jurisdiction is controlling authority; the right of making and enforcing laws or regulations;  the 
capacity of determining rules of action or use, and exacting penalties;  the function or capacity of 
judging or governing in general;  the inherent power of decision or control."
	People v. Pierce, 41 N.Y. S.  858, 860, 18 Mis 83.
16a/During the recent takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran with the capture of embassy 
personnel as "hostages" by the Iranian student militants with the acquiescence of the Iranian 
government, the Carter administration accused Iran of "abrogating international law" introducing a 
petition to the International Court at the Hague seeking judicial redress.
17/In the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the Vaschenko and Chmykhalov families, Soviet citizens, have been 
living for 3 years, given"asylum" by the U.S. Government.  Soviet authorities respect the territorial  
validity of the "foreign" embassy.  A reciprocal respect by U.S. authorities would pertain if the situation 
were reversed in Washington, D.C.
18/"The law of nations is 'part of our law'."  Hilton v. Guyot, N.Y. 1895, 16 S.Ct. 139, 159, US 163, 40 L. Ed. 
95.
19/"By what right (does one treat) a foreign state as a sort of sewer into which one is entitled to 
discharge his social detritus?"  Expulsion des Heimatlos, 60, Philonenko, Journal de Droit International, 
1161, 117, 1933, quoted in Preuss.                                              
7
P. 162

	The respondent claims, and both the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
concur, that the petitioner renounced his nationality "in a foreign state."  (See p. 
3, Brief of Appellee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, (1)(b) 3rd para., D.C. 
Memorandum, C. of A.)  This judgment is in error.  Petitioner, as stated, took the 
Oath of Renunciation before a consular officer in  the United States, so recognized 
by the French State, that is, in the U.S. Embassy, situated on U.S. territory, in Paris.
	Should the Court consider this argument specious, petitioner humbly 
suggests that the very concept then of "foreign state" is likewise specious, not to 
mention "foreign policy," "foreign affairs," and the like.
	Your petitioner suggests that Congress recognized the anomaly of 
expatriation in our century if performed without acquiring another nationality 
or already possessing one (as do most ämigräs to the United States) in this 
mischievous construction.  It has gone unchallenged till now for the obvious 
reason that an "expatriate" with intent to renounce all allegiance to the United 
States would have neither motive nor opportunity, as does your petitioner, to 
expose the inherent contradiction.
	To consider this crucial issue another way, the construction of the statute 
should logically be:
...(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic 
or consular officer in the United States Embassy in such form, etc.
	However, such a construction at once exposes the basic fallacy of 
expatriation taken alone.  For it implies that the "expatriate," being still on U.S. 
"soil" must then commit the act of illegal entry to a "foreign state," or else remain 
forever in the U.S. Embassy as a "stateless" person.  This in turn exposes the 
"horizontal" character of "expatriation" where, when one state "loses" a human 
being, another state "gains" one.
	If, however, the alleged expatriate chooses to remain "stateless," and does not 
wish to suffer the "punishment" which inevitably emanates from the state which 
he is forced to enter illegally, he must "verticalize" himself by claiming a 
transcendent civic status for the protection of his unalienable rights.20 
	Petitioner, in "entering" France after the alleged expatriation act by leaving 
the U.S. compound, broke the French law of entry, was subsequently declared 
"persona non grata" by French Immigration and given 48 hours to leave the 
country or face imprisonment.21
______________________ 
20/"...In consequence of many recent developments--the rising demands of people for human 
dignity values, the expanding identities for whom these values are being demanded, the 
increasingly realistic perception of the condition of interdependence, and the growing 
insistence that a principal goal of global constitutive process is the protection of common 
interest-- there would appear to be today a growing recognition and acceptance, even demand, 
that the protection and fultillment of human rights be regarded as matters of international 
concern," for the employment of all constitutive functions, rather than as matters of 'domestic 
jurisdiction.'  Indeed many of the policies about human rights would appear to be so intensely 
demanded that they are acquiring...not merely the status of 'international concern,' but in 
addition that of jus cogens  or of a global bill of rights."
	Human Rights and World Public Order, 135, McDougal, Lassell, Chen, Yale University 
Press, 1980.
21/Such incarceration would endure until petitioner obtained entry papers to another state or 
died.
	"The powerlessness of the stateless person is most apparent in the limitation upon his 
freedom of movement, both of egress and return....  Unable to enter the territory of a state 
lawfully, he is often compelled to do so clandestinely...."  A Study of Statelessness, 139, UN 
document.               P. 163                          8
	The original anomaly of "expatriation", i.e., becoming "stateless in a world of 
states, began repeating itself till the present case.
	While Judge Flannery acknowledged that "statelessness was the intended 
consequence of petitioner's May 24 (sic), 1948 actions at the United States 
Embassy. . ." (page 8, Memorandum and opinion) and that "whatever harshness 
may attach to statelessness is therefore inapplicable to the instant case..." (page 
9), he failed to note the anomaly resulting from the application of 8 U.S.C. 
1841(a)(5) exposed in his Court by the petitioner's very presence.
	In conclusion, since the Act of Renunciation can actually only be performed 
"...before a diplomatic or consular officer..." in a United States Embassy, those 
allegedly performing this Act do not do so in accordance with the enabling 
statute.  This Court alone can determine if they, including your petitioner, have 
legally "expatriated" themselves.
						III
BOTH THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION ACKNOWLEDGE RIGHTS RETAINED "BY THE 
PEOPLE."  IF THE EXPATRIATING INDIVIDUAL POSSESSES NO 
OTHER NATIONALITY NOR ACQUIRES ONE, GIVEN PRESENT 
STATUTES, THESE RIGHTS MUST BE EXERCISED BY INDIVIDUAL 
CONCERNED FOR THE PROTECTION OF HIS FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS AND SUBSEQUENT RIGHTS.  THE EXERCISE OF RIGHTS 
IS BOTH ANTERIOR TO AND INDEPENDENT OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.  ITS POLITICAL COROLLARY IS 
A NEW CITIZENSHIP OF A GLOBAL CHARACTER, HUMAN RIGHTS 
BEING UNIVERSAL,IDENTIFYING BOTH THE INCLUSIVE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF MANKIND AND THE UNALIENABLE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

a.  The Dichotomy Between Expatriation and Statelessness
	Your petitioner personifies both the principle of expatriation and 
statelessness.  Therefore this Court is faced with both latter-day political 
phenomena in the instant and novel case.
	Congress has determined that expatriation is a basic human right.  (Act of 
July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223).  Then it applies equally to all human beings.  
Indeed, the history of expatriation reveals that it had to be considered 
reciprocally, that is, for incoming nationals of foreign states as well as for United 
States citizens.
	In 1868, the United States Congress proclaimed:
"...the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all 
people,  indispensable to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness; . . "...the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent 
right of all people,  .any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or 
decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, 
impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government."  
(Act of July 27, 1968)  (Emphasis added.)





						9

P. 164
	While the Act does not mention statelessness as such, the clear implication is 
that the result of expatriation is statelessness which by implication is 
"indispensable to the enjoyment. . .etc."22 
	At the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law, the 
United States delegation made a strong plea for the incorporation of the principle 
of voluntary expatriation in these words:
"For a century past, it has been the policy of my country that the right 
of expatriation is an inherent and natural right of all persons.   It is 
true that allegiance is a duty, but it is not a chain that holds a person in 
bondage and that he carries with him to a new life in a new land. . .  
This principle is not a small matter.  It is not a question of language or 
of formulae, or of phrases.  It is a principle of the rights of man  and of 
the liberty of the human race."  (Emphasis added).
	The reference to "the rights of man" and "the liberty of the human race" 
vividly identifies the anomaly presented by the limitations of national law.  For 
the rights of man and the liberty of the human race connote their protection by 
positive law transcending that of the exclusive nation, in other words, world law 
encompassing the human race as such.23 
	The collective nations, however, recognized that voluntary expatriation 
condones anarchy.  For, in the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
adopted August 30, 1961, Article 7(1)(a) states:
"If the law of the Contracting State permits renunciation of nationality, 
such renunciation shall not result in loss of nationality unless the 
person concerned possesses or acquires another nationality."
	With regard to the forcing of expatriated individuals upon another state, Sir 
John Fischer Williams, writing nearly half a century ago, (Denationalization, 8 
Brit, Y.B., Int'l. L. 47, 1927) stated that:
"...while positive international law does not forbid a state unilaterally to 
sever the relationship of nationality so far as the individual is 
concerned, even if the person affected possesses or acquires no other 
nationality, still a state cannot sever the ties of nationality in such a 
way as to release itself from the international duty, owed to other states, 
of receiving back a person denationalized who has acquired no other 
nationality, should he be expelled as an alien by the state where he 
happens to be."
	Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 365 US 86,  102, described the stateless 
dilemma vividly:
______________________
22/"The status of statelessness entails a most severe and dramatic deprivation of the power of 
the individual.  Just as, within the state, nationality is the 'right to have rights,' so also, on 
the transnational level, nationality is the right to have protection in rights.  The stateless 
person has no state to 'protect' him and lacks even the freedom of movement to find a state that 
is willing to protect him....  Statelessness often results in suffering and hardship shocking to 
conscience and the dignity of man"
	3rd Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, UN Document, 1953.
23/"Nationality is a concept created in the past to promote a minimum organization of the 
world under past conditions.  The references and function of the concept cannot remain static:  
it must be as dynamic as the changing demands and identification of peoples and the changing 
configurations of the world and national constitutive process."
	Human Rights and World Public Order, p. 957, McDougal, Lasswell, Chen, Yale U. 
Press, 1980.    p. 165                  10

"...There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive 
torture.  There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status 
in organized society.  It is a form of punishment more primitive than 
torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was 
centuries in the development.  The punishment (of expatriation) strips 
the citizen of his status in the national and international community.  
His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he 
happens to find himself.  While any one country may accord him some 
rights, and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would 
enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is 
stateless.  Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an 
alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of 
deportation.  In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.   
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the 
Constitution stands. . .  "  (Emphasis added).
	In brief, while the right of expatriation may be a human right and a basic 
freedom to an ämigrä nation such as the United States, it has become, in the 
political turmoil of the 20th century, ironically, a degrading deprivation of such 
rights as represented in the instant case.
	In Afroyim v. Rusk,  387 U.S. 253, 268 (1968) this Court declared that "in some 
instances loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection of 
citizenship in any country of the world--as a man without a country."  But the 
very law permitting expatriation--8 U.S.C. 1841(a)(5)--in effect condones  a state 
of anarchy for the individual who avails himself of this right.  The stateless 
person, as the Court is aware, does not exist in a vacuum, legal or actual.24   The 
very word "stateless," though, connotes the arrogant assumption that only the 
state enjoys legitimacy.25  On the contrary, the right of expatriation is in reality 
the right to return to a "state of nature," that pristine state anterior to the 
organization of human societies into states or nations.  It must be, therefore, the 
state where sovereignty begins.26 
____________________
24/"...Everyman has a right to live somewhere on the earth."  Thomas Jefferson, 1801 
presidential address.
25/"The notion that states are the only appropriate 'subjects' of international law is belied by 
all the contemporary facts...about participation in the global processes of effective power and 
authoritative decisions.  This notion, unknown to the founding fathers and deriving from 
certain parochial misconceptions of the late nineteenth century, lingers on to impede the 
protection of human rights merely because it sometimes serves the power purposes of the state 
elites.... Historically, the greatest difficulty concerning participation in the world 
constitutive process has been this exaggeration of the role of the nation-state as the principal 
subject  of international law.  Because of the overwhelming emphasis on the 'sovereignty' of 
nation-states, there has been a great reluctance to recognize other participants in world social 
process as in fact active subjects of international law."
    Human Rights and World Public Order,  p. 178.
26/"Individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a 
compact with each other to produce a government and this is the only mode in which 
governments have a right to exist, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist."  
   The Rights of Man,  Thomas Paine. 
    "Everyman...possesses the right of self-government...individuals exercise it by their single 
will."   Thomas Jefferson, 1790.
   "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."  Art. 21(3), 
U.D.H.R.                p. 166                  11
	Your petitioner, while having allegedly expatriated himself from the 
exclusive national fiction, categorically denies that he "gave up" or could "give 
up" his native country.  On the contrary, he renounced being exclusively 
national precisely in order to protect his country, part of the world community.
	While this Court recognized in Afroyim  that statelessness could result from 
expatriation, your petitioner suggests that the legislative body of the United 
States, bound by oath to uphold the constitutive process, cannot, in full knowledge 
and with willful intent, make laws which, in their exercise, condone lawlessness.  
If expatriation cannot be used as a punishment for crime as determined in Trop,  
the "punishment" being statelessness, then Congress cannot contrarily permit 
voluntary expatriation without at the same time recognizing the inherent and 
unalienable rights of the expatriated individual,  or else the act becomes simply 
"the loss of the right to have rights," antithetical to the protection of the rights of 
"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness."
	The lower courts, in upholding respondent's irrational position, have 
imposed on the petitioner-- and all other native-born Americans who may find 
themselves in the same position-- what Trop  considered a "penal punishment" 
but of a more insidious nature.  Neither is he "in" or "outside" the United States but 
exists in a sort of legal vacuum continually under the threat of deportation or 
arbitrary detention.27 
	But how much more reprehensible-- and ironic-- do the U.S. exclusion 
statutes appear when the person excluded has 'expatriated" himself for the 
generous reason of attempting to extend his sovereignty as an essential part of 
the constitutive process itself-- on which both the several states and the federal 
union are founded-- to the total world community for the promotion of world 
peace, a condition professed to be the No. 1 "foreign policy" of the present as well 
as past administration?
	One question before the Court therefore is, can the U.S. Congress, on the one 
hand, confirm the human right of "expatriation" as basic to freedom while at the 
same deny the human exercising that right the corollary human right of freedom 
of travel and re-entry to his native country?28 
	To exclude him while admitting implicitly that he must live somewhere on 
the planet is to impose on other states the obligation of his protection, subjecting 
him to their tyranny as described by the former Chief Justice, or to maintain the 
continual threat of deportation or detention, though neither "solution" is 
justifiable.29 
	  b.  The Ninth Amendment Implicitly Condones World Citizenship and      
	 World Government
	The only Constitutional amendment referring specifically to "rights retained 
by the people" is of course the Ninth Amendment.
______________________
27/"A person brought into the United States by the authorities and then released on bond is 
considered as having never entered the United States and as being in a position analogous to 
one who was stopped at the border and kept there." Ling Yee Suey v. Spar, CC A.N.Y. 1945 149 
F 2d 881.
28/"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country."  Article 13(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
29/"In my faith, the American concept of man's dignity does not comport with making even 
those we would punish completely 'stateless'-- fair game for the despoiler at home and the 
oppressor abroad, if indeed there is any place which will tolerate them at all."  Trop. v. 
Dulles,  Note 33, 643, E. Warren, CJ.       P. 167    12
	The expatriate is forced by the circumstances of his essentially unprotected 
legal situation immediately to represent himself  in the exercise of these 
fundamental rights.  In the words of McDougal, Lasswell and Chen:
"...The substantive human rights prescriptions can never be made 
effective if the individual human being is not himself accorded 
competence to invoke them under appropriate conditions.  The 
individual should be made a full subject of international law, with that 
access to all arenas, both international and national, which is 
necessary for him to protect himself."  Human Rights and World 
Public Order,   p. 955.
	It if was not Congress's intent to 1) condemn the expatriate to a condition of 
perpetual "punishment," and 2) force a fellow state to undertake the obligation of 
residence under whatever conditions for the expatriate, then implicitly it 
expected said expatriate to exercise the "rights retained  by the people."  
(Emphasis added).
	Your petitioner, in his original statement at the time of his alleged 
renunciation, claimed to extend his sovereignty "as a member of the world 
community..." to the "international vacuum of its government...," a construction 
which emphasized the essential anarchic condition between nation-states.  He 
claimed as well to be a "citizen of the world," both claims falling precisely within 
the concept and exercise of the Ninth Amendment as "rights retained by the 
people," as well as the concept of multiple citizenship recognized implicitly in the 
Tenth Amendment.
	It goes without saying that these unalienable rights can neither be denied 
nor prohibited by this Court but contrarily, can only be affirmed by it.30 
	Petitioner claims therefore that statelessness is an inadmissible consequence 
of 8 U.S.C. 1841(a)(5) in that it condemns the "expatriate" to a condition of 
anarchy, and 2) that the new compact known as "world citizenship" with its 
corollary sanctioning institution, World Government, the aggregate of individual 
compacts, is the logical, inevitable and legitimate outcome of the application of 
the Ninth Amendment in the instant case.31 (See U.S. v. Cook,  D.C. Pa. 1970, 311 
F.Supp. 618).
		  c. United States District Court Memorandum Opinion Acknowledges       
		 Global Status of Petitioner.
	Judge Thomas Flannery stated in his Memorandum Opinion of December 19, 
1979 in the instant case that:
"This opinion fails to prevent the petitioner or any other person from 
continuing to work for world peace through the vehicle of world 
citizenship and world government."
______________________
30/By elementary reasoning, if the people are sovereign, as inferred in both the Ninth and 
Tenth amendments, then they are sovereign not as "American" or national citizens, but as 
humans.  It follows that the world's people, i.e., humankind, as such, represents the ultimate 
and largest sovereignty of which the "American" people are a part.  As the national public 
order is derived from the sovereignty of the people residing within the national community, so 
it must follow that a world public order can and must derive from the world's people residing 
in the world community.  Then any social order which excludes  the recognition of humankind 
itself as the ultimate sovereignty denies at the same time the essential sovereignty of the 
people from which itself derived.  Thus a national constitution can neither deny, inhibit or in 
any way limit the sovereignty of humankind itself.
31/"The Constitution of the state and the nation recognize unenumerated rights of natural 
endowment."  Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Case,  1902, 380 P.2d 34, 151 Colo 230. 
p. 168                                          13

	The definition of "vehicle," (American College Dictionary,  1950 Ed.) is  "1. 
any receptacle, or means of transport, in which something is carried or conveyed 
or travels...  3.  a means of conveyance, transmission or communication,  4.  a 
medium by which ideas or effects are communicated."
	"Medium," according to the same source, is defined in part as "6.  an agency, 
means or instrument."
	The Honorable Judge, in other words, did not consider either world 
citizenship or world government as mere concepts or ideals unrealizable in 
practical terms but on the contrary clearly acknowledged their pragmatic 
existence as valid "conveyors" or "instruments" or "mediums" for world peace.
	Petitioner suggests that this acknowledgment represents an unprecedented 
construction to be viewed as within the purview of the Ninth Amendment, 
heretofore unutilized in any case in its broadest interpretation, i.e., the right to 
found government.
	As the rights "retained by the people" can only be the natural rights 
referred to in the Declaration of Independence, the primordial one-- the right to 
create government among consenting individuals where none existed before-- 
merits full recognition by this Court.
	Given the context of our desperate times in which nations continue their 
insane arming for a final test of force, yet the people of the world seek their 
legitimacy for their wholesale and individual protection against war itself and its 
dreadful consequences, this Court, oath-bound to adjudicate all constitutional 
issues, cannot refuse to consider this novel yet vital application of the Ninth 
Amendment which at once wisely defines the limitations of government and 
affirms appropriately the unalienable sovereignty of the people.
	


























P. 169                                                  14










					CONCLUSION

	1.  The lower courts' decision should be reversed because in the instant 
case, where petitioner is characterized as both an "excludable alien," and a 
"stateless person," the relevant statutes are clearly contradictory and, ipso facto, 
inoperable.
	2.  The construction of the statute enabling expatriation contains a 
fundamental error rendering the law unusable;  said statute's constitutionality is 
questionable.
	3.  The Ninth Amendment, in recognition of rights "retained by the 
people," implicitly sanctions the natural rights of the individual to enter into a 
willful civic compact with others in accordance with their ongoing political and 
social needs and desires.  The Court must subsequently recognize this new compact 
which, in the petitioner's case, is a world citizenship already subscribed to by 
hundreds of thousands of individuals throughout the human and world 
community.
	Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, petitioner urges the Court to 
grant a writ of certiorari.

					Respectfully submitted,

					Garry Davis
					3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
					Washington, D.C. 20016

						















P. 170                                          15



					









APPENDIX








































P. 171

FULL STATEMENT OF PETITIONER, May 25, 1948

	"In the absence of an international government, our world, politically, is a 
raw, naked anarchy.  Two global wars have shown that as long as two or more 
powerful sovereign nation-states regard their own national law as supreme and 
sufficient to handle affairs between nations, there can be no order on a planetary 
level.  This international anarchy is moving us swiftly toward a final war.
	I no longer find it compatible with my inner convictions to contribute to this 
anarchy—and thus be a party to the inevitable suicide of our civilization—by 
remaining solely loyal to one of these sovereign nation-states.  I must extend the 
little sovereignty I possess, as a member of the world community, to the whole 
community, and to the international vacuum of its government—a vacuum into 
which the rest of the world must b drawn if it would survive, for therein lies the 
only alternative to this final war.
	
	I should like to consider myself a citizen of the world.
	all history has shown—and especially American history—that peace is not 
merely the absence of war, but the presence of a superstructure of law and order, 
in short, government, over non-integrated political units of equal sovereignty.  
The world today is split by seventy to eighty of these sovereign units.  Therefore, 
without the immediate creation of this superstructure of law and order, each unit 
must continue the idiotic, suicidal, unchristian and undemocratic anarchy of 
Nationalism, and the resulting atomic-biological war will then level all political, 
economic, religious, and personal differences by death.

	The real question today seems to be: World Citizenship or World War?

	One leads to peace.  The other leads to oblivion.

	And the choice is ours."






















p. 172                                                  1a
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED—SEE LOCAL RULE 8 (r)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
FORTHE DISTRIT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

NO. 80-1071                                                             September Term, 1980

Garry Davis, Appellant                                           Civil Action No. 79-1874

	v.                                                                 Filed March 31, 1981
										  George A. Fisher
District Director, Immigration                                            Clerk

&  Naturalization Service

Appeal from the United State District for the District of Columbia

Before: BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, ROBINSON and EDWARDS, CIRCUIT JUDGES.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the record on appeal from the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, and was argued by counsel.
	
	On consideration thereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the 
judgment——————of the District Court appealed from in this cause is hereby 
affirmed, in accordance with the attached memorandum.

						Per Curiam
						For the Court
							/s/
						George A. Fisher, Clerk

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.  The Court looks 
with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time.




















P. 173                                                  1b
No. 80-1071—Davis v. District Director, INS

MEMORANDUM

	For substantially the reasons set forth in the DitrictCourt's opinion, we agree 
that appellant effectively renounced his citizenship, see 8 U.S.C. 1841(a)(5)(1976).  
As the Immigration and NaturaliztionService (INS) recognizes, this action should 
not foreclose appellant from reacquiring lawful permanent resident status.  The 
INS Board of Immigration and appeals expressly noted that appellant's immediat 
family members are United State citizenswho ould secureappellant a permanent 
resisent visa, see 8 U.S.C. 1151(a), 1153(Ia)(1,5)(1976).  Moreover, counsel forthe 
INS advised this Court at argument that appellant's laudable military record could 
qualify him for naturaliztion, see 8 U.S.C. 1440 (1976).









































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARRY DAVIS

		Plaintiff,

v.

DISTRICT DIRECTOR Civil Action No. 79-1874
IMMIGRATION 7 NATURALIZATION
SERVICE

		Defendant.



MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
	This case presents the issue whether a native-born American may renounce 
primary allegiance to the United States and still retain rights to enter and remain 
in this country without a proper visa.  Petitioner Garry Davis brings this suit in 
the form of a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner seeks the writ to relieve him of 
the restraint and custody imposed by the Immigration an Naturalization Service 
("INS").  The Board of Immigration Appeals on May 24, 1978 voted to exclude and 
deport the petitioner.
	The petitioner is a native of the Untied States and served as a bomber pilot 
during World War II.  On May 25, 1948,k he voluntarily signed an oath of 
renunciation of United States nationality at the American Embassy in Paris, 
France.
	The petitioner executed the oath in conformity with then Section 401(f) of 
the nationality Act.  Now codified at 8 U.S.C. par. 1481(a)(5), this section allows a 
native-born American to voluntarily renounce United States citizenship.  The 
statute reads the same today as in 1948:
(a)...a person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or 
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by—
	(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or
	 consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form 
	as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State...
	The petitioner signed the oath of renunciation before the United States 
Consul.  The oath of renunciation included the statement:

	I desire to make a formal renunciation of my American nationality, as provided 
by Section 401(f) of the Nationality Act of 1940, and pursuant thereto I hereby 
absolutely and entirely renounce my nationality in the United Sates, and all rights 
and privileges thereunder pertaining and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to the 
United States of America.






p. 175                                          1c

	The petitioner, on May 25, 1948, also filed a statement of his beliefs with the 
United States Consul in Paris.  The relevant portion of this statement, which forms 
the basis of one of petitioner's legal arguments, reads as follows:

   I no longer find it compatible with my inner convictions...by remaining solely 
loyal to one of these sovereign nation states. I must extend the little sovereignty I 
possess, as a member of the world community, to the whole community, and to the 
international vacuum of its government...I should like to consider myself a citizen of 
the world.

	The United States Consul issued the petitioner a Certificate of Loss of 
nationality of the United States on May 25, 1948.  Petitioner henceforth devoted 
his time and energy toward the establishment of world government and the 
furtherance of world citizenship.  He frequently travels abroad to promote these 
principles and goals.  He has at various times entered the United States on a 
permanent resident alien or on a visitor's visa.
	On May 13, 1977, the petitioner attempted to enter the United States on a 
passport issued by the "World Service Authority", an organization formed to 
promote world citizenship.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
conducted an exclusion hearing four days later, on May 17, 1977.  The petitioner 
stated at the hearing that "I am the president and the chairman of the Board of an 
organization called the World Service Authority."  The administrative law judge 
found the petitioner deportable.  The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this 
decision on May 24, 1978. The Board, relying on 8 U.S.C. par. 1182(a)(20), found the 
petitioner excludable because he lacked a valid document of entry.  The petitioner 
filed the instant writ of habeas corpus on July 19, 1979.
	The petitioner contends that he never expatriated himself.  He alleges that 
the statement of beliefs he filed with the United States Embassy creates sufficient 
ambiguity to preclude renunciation of citizenship. The petitioner secondly argues 
that renunciation of citizenship requires the acquisition of another nationality.  
Finally, the petitionr alleges that Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, providing that "everyone has the right...to return to his country," 
requires the INS to allow the petitioner to enter and remain in the United States 
without any immigration papers.
	The Immigration and Naturalization Service argues that the petitioner is 
neither a citizen nor a national of the United States.  He therefore qualifies only 
as an alien who must be excluded under 8 U.S.C. par. 1182(a)(20).  This statute 
requires exclusion if a person does not possess a "valid unexpired immigration 
visa." The Court agrees with the INS and will order the dismissal of the habeas 
petition.

	I. PETITIONER LACKS THE STATUS OF A UNITED STATES CITIZEN
	8 U.S.C. par. 1481(a) codifies a long standing though little recognized 
principle of the United States: the right of expatriation.  This principle establishes 
the libertarian concept that a citizen may voluntarily surrender his citizenship 
along with the panoply of rights and obligations that attach thereto.






176                                                     2c
Federal statutory [some words missing here]with the panoply of rights and 
obligations that attach thereto. Federal statutory law sets forth numerous avenues 
by which a United States citizen may voluntarily expatriate himself.1  Federal 
courts require only voluntariness and sometimes intent to uphold the validity of 
the expatriating act.
	A.  Petitioner's Intent was Unambiguous.
	The petitioner alleges that his statement of beliefs, submitted on the same day 
he signed his oath of renunciation, creates ambiguity whether expatriation 
occurred.  If factually correct, then the intent of the petitioner is open to 
question.
	Whether subjective intent is a prerequisite to expatriation is an unresolved 
issue.  Until the decision of Afroyim v. Rusk,  387 U.S. 253 (1976), the Supreme 
Court consistently held that objective proof of the voluntary act was enough to 
surrender citizenship.2   The voluntariness concept espoused in Afroyim may be 
read, however, to encompass an inquiry into subjective intent.3   Such an inquiry 
could be determinative of the validity of the expatriating act.  For example, it is 
conceivable that a person may not intend to relinquish United States citizenship 
yet objectively perform an expatriating act enumerated in 8 U.S.C. par.1481(a).
	A voluntary oath of renunciation is a clear statement of desire to relinquish 
United States citizenship; therefore, the question of intent would normally not 
arise under 8 U.S.C. par. 1481(a)(5).  See 3 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration 
Law Procedure par. 201.10b at 20-62, 73 (1979 ed.) (subjective intent, though 
perhaps relevant to some methods of expatriation, "irrelevant" to formal 
renunciation of American citizenship).  In the instant case, however, the 
petitioner has raised the issue of intent by suggesting his statement of beliefs 
creates ambiguity over whether expatriation occurred. The Court would be 
reluctant to affirm the expatriation of a person who did not intend to relinquish 
citizenship. We therefore address the question of intent.
	Contrary to the petitioner's allegation, the Court recognizes no ambiguity in 
the May 25, 1948 statement of beliefs the petitioner filed with the United State 
Consul.  That statement leaves little doubt that the petitioner sought to relinquish 
his rights as a United States citizen.  According to the petitioner's statement, he 
could no longer remain "solely loyal" to the United States; instead, "I must extend 
the little sovereignty I possess, as a member of the world community, to the whole 
community..."
________________________
1/Each subdivision under 8 U.S.C. par. 1481(a) represents a separate and independent 
process that leads to expatriation.  These subdivision are independently self-executing; a 
citizen satisfying the provisions of one subsection may be expatriated pursuant to that 
provision. 
2/See, e.g., Nishiwaka v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 136 (1958) ("Unless voluntariness is put in 
issue, the Government makes its case simply by proving the objective expatriating 
act.");Peers v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958) ("Congress can attach loss of citizenship 
only as a consequence of conduct engaged in voluntarily"); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 
U.S. 491, 502 (1950) (voluntariness, despite contrary intent, sufficient to uphold 
expatriation).
3/See United States v. Matheson, 532 F. 2d 809, 814 (2d Cir.) (interpret AfroyimI to 
require subjective intent), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976);42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969) 
(Afroyim leaves open to individual petitioner whether to raise issue of intent).


p. 177                                          3c
	
	The statement of beliefs was devoid of any language recognizing a continued 
primary allegiance to the United States.  Rather, the petitioner renounced his 
claim of sovereignty to any specific nation.  His primary loyalty, according to his 
own language, belongs to "the world community."  The Court finds that language 
renouncing primary loyalty to the United States and affirming primary 
allegiance to a world community complements, rather than conflicts with, a 
formal oath of renunciation of citizenship. The statement of beliefs therefore 
creates no ambiguity; it supplements the petitioner's clear intent o renounce 
United States citizenship.

	B. Petitioner's Renunciation Was Voluntary
	Voluntariness is uniformly recognized as a requirement toward upholding 
the validity of an expatriating act.  The Supreme Court accordingly has reversed 
an expatriation of an American involuntarily conscripted into the Japanese 
Army, Nishiwaka v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958), reversed expatriation based 
solely on a conviction for military desertion absent a voluntary desire to 
renounce citizenship, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1958), and reversed the 
expatriation of a person who voted in a foreign election but who did not 
voluntarily relinquish citizenship.  Afroyim v. Rusk,  387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).  The 
Court recognized in Afroyim "that the only way the citizenship it (Congress) 
conferred could be lost was by voluntary renunciation or abandonment by the 
citizen himself." Id. at 266.
	Voluntariness was never at issue in the instant case.  The petitioner 
independently and without duress renounced his citizenship by signing an oath 
of renunciation on May 25, 1948. The Court therefore finds that the petitioner' 
voluntary and unambiguous renunciation meets the structures of 8 U.S.C. par. 
1481(a)(5).
	This finding necessitates a ruling that the petitioner expatriated himself. In 
many circumstances, a finding of voluntariness alone would be sufficient to 
uphold the act of expatriation.4  In the instant case, as explained above, it was also 
incumbent upon the court to examine intent.  Having scrutinized these  elements 
of expatriation, and having found that the petitioner's intent was unambiguous 
and the petitioner's renunciation was voluntary, the Court rules the petitioner no 
longer qualifies as a United States citizen.

	C.   Renunciation of Citizenship Does Not Require Acquisition of 
Another Nationality.
_________________________
4/These circumstances occur when intent is not at issue. The question of intent will 
seldom be raised in adjudicating several types of expatriation.  See 3 C. Gordon &H. 
Rosenfield, Immigration Law &Procedure 20.8b at 20-61-62 (2979 ed.) (subjective intent 
normally irrelevant to expatriation based on acquisition of another nationality and 
voluntary renunciation of citizenship). In these cases the court need only examine 
voluntariness.  However, where, as here, the question of intent is raised b the petitioner, 
we believe it is appropriate to examine intent. 





p. 178                                          4c
	The oath of Renunciation recited by the petitioner, as applied to the 
applicable federal law, revoked the petitioner's citizenship. 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5) 
does not require allegiance to another nation; it only requires renunciation of 
United States nationality.
	The framework of 8 U.S.C. 1481(a) reinforces the plain meaning of the 
statute. 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(1) provides that an American national can lose his 
nationality by declaring allegiance to a foreign state, whereas 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5) 
provides a separate category for those who renounce United States nationality.  By 
creating two separate categories—one for the acquisition of a foreign nationality 
and one for the renunciation of United States nationality—Congress could only 
have intended that each statutory section represents a separate method of 
expatriation.
	The imposition of statelessness upon the petitioner cannot deter this Court 
from the requirements of the federal nationality law.5  The Supreme Court 
recognized that expatriation may result in statelessness in Afroyim v. Rusk, supra.  
InAfroyim the Court declared that "(i)n some instances loss of citizenship can 
mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship in any country in 
the world—as a man without a country." 387 U.S. at 268.
	Expatriation previously resulted in statelessness in Jolly v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 441 F. 2d 1245 (5thCir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971).   In 
Jolly, the petitioner executed a formal renunciation of citizenship before a United 
States Consul in Canada. Id.  The petitioner subsequently returned to the United 
States without a visa.  In affirming in INS's deportation order, the Fifth Circuit 
recognized that Jolley's oath of renunciation alone was enough to deprive him of 
citizenship:
Recognizing that a citizen has a right to renounce his citizenship, Congress has 
provided in 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(6) now (5)) formal procedures for doing so.  Jolley's 
renunciation satisfied these procedures.
Id. at 1249 n. 6; see also id. at 1259 (Rives, J. dissenting) (dissents becomes unclear 
if petitioner intended to become stateless person).  Jolly thus demonstrates that 
expatriation, effectuated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5), requires only the 
renunciation of United States citizenship, and not the acquisition of a foreign 
nationality.
	Finally, the Court must remain cognizant that statelessness was the intended 
consequence of the petitioner's May 24, 1948 actions at the United States 
Embassy.6  The petitioner's statement of beliefs explicated that rather than 
remaining solely loyal to one sovereign state, "I would like to consider myself a
_________________________
5/¨(T)he citizen's voluntary abandonment of his citizenship apparently will be effectuated 
if accomplished in compliance with law, even though statelessness may result." Gordon, 
The Citizen and the State, 53 Geo. L.J. 315, 36061 (1965). 
6/This finding answers the objection raised in the Jolley dissent.  Judge Rives dissented 
there because, inter alia, he was unsure whether the petitioner intended statelessness.  
Herein, statelessness was the calculated result of the petitioner's actions.








p. 179                                          5c
citizen of the world."  In an interview with INS officials on May 13, 1977, the 
petitioner affirmed that "I have no nationality. I renounced my nationality 1948 
in Paris, France...I am a World Citizen."  The petitioner affirmatively sought his 
stateless existence.  Whatever harshness may attach to statelessness is therefore 
inapplicable to the instant case.7 

II. PETITIONER IS AN ALIEN AND THUS REQUIRES PROPER 
IMMIGRATION PAPERS TO ENTER AND REMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
	Any person not a United States citizen or national is classified as an alien.  8 
U.S.C. 1101(a)(3); see C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield,1 Immigration Law and Procedure  
2.3d at 2-22 (1979)(ed.).  The petitioner's voluntary expatriation deprived him of 
citizenship.  He also lacks the status of a United States national.
	The section of the expatriation statute that allowed the petitioner to 
voluntarily relinquish citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5), speaks in terms of "making 
a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer..." 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22) defines a national as either a 
citizen or a person who owes permanent allegiance to the United States.  The 
petitioner's expatriation deprives him of citizenship; his oath of renunciation 
stated that "I...abjure all allegiance and fidelity to the United States of America." 
The petitioner is therefore an alien by virtue of lacking the status of a citizen or 
national.
	An alien must possess a proper entry document upon entering the United 
States.  8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20) provides:
...any immigrant who at the time of application for admission is not in possession 
of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing 
identification card, or other valid entry document required by this chapter (is 
excludable).
_________________________
 7/The petitioner's contention that Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights requires the acquisition of another nationality to  uphold expatriation is without 
merit.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a United Nations Document.  3 U.N. 
Doc. a/810 (1948).  It is well established that the United Nations Charter does not 
supersede United States law. See, e.g. Haiti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,  343 
F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965);Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F2d 
398, 400 (I7th Cr. 1959).
	The petitioner's argument based on Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights fails for the same reason.



























































[Where is the "8" for the footnote?]

	The petitioner's World Service Authority Passport fails to qualify as one of 
the documents required by 8 U.S.C. 1182. The Board of Immigration Appeals thus 
properly found the petitioner excludable.  We therefore affirm that ruling and 
order the dismissal of this habeas petition.  Because the petitioner has close 
relations in the United States who may apply on his behalf for a visa, the 
petitioner may remain in this country by merely assenting to permanent resident 
alien status.
	The Court in no way wishes to deprecate the honesty of belief or 
depth of conviction that the petitioner feels for the cause of world 
citizenship.  This opinion fails to prevent the petitioner or any other 
person from continuing to work for world peace though the vehicle 
of world citizenship and world government.  (emphasis added) Any person 
who desires to pursue this goal while residing in the United States, however, must 
obey this nation's immigration and naturalization laws.  We therefore only hold 
that if a person intentionally and voluntarily renounces United States citizenship, 
then such person must obtain proper visa certification to enter and remain in the 
United States.
	An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

							(signed: Thomas A. Flannery)
							UNITE STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: 12-19-79

___________________________
 8/The petitioner raised for the first  time at oral argument the theory that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, allows the petitioner to 
enter and remain in the United States by virtue of being a citizen of Maine. This argument, 
though novel, fails to take account of Congressional power to establish nationality laws.
	The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, serves to prevent one 
state from discriminating against another state.  Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
establishes that "Congress shall have power...To establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization."  This Constitutional mandate empowers Congress to define "the process 
through which citizenship is acquired or lost, "to determine" the criteria by which 
citizenship is judged," and to fix "the consequences citizenship or noncitizenship entail."  
L.Tribe, American Constitutional Law  277 (1978).
	These two constitutional provisions are not in conflict: a state may not discriminate 
against a citizen of another state, by, for example, restricting travel or access, but 
Congress has the power to determine the standards by which a person lacking the status of 
United States citizen shall enter and remain in the United States.  Because Congress has 
determine that an alien must possess a proper document of entry to enter and remain in 
this country, the petitioner must either obtain a proper visa or be subjected to 
deportation.



p. 181                                          7c









UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the District of Columbia Circuit


No. 80-1071                                                             September Term, 1980
	
Garry Davis,                                                            Civil Action No. 79-1874
		Appellant

		v.

District Director,
Immigration and Naturalization
Service                                                                 ARGUED 3-11-81

BEFORE: Robinson, Chief Judge; Bazelon, Senior Circuit Judge and Edwards, Circuit 
Judge

O R D E R 

	On consideration of appellant's petition for an order extending time for 
filing for a rehearing en banc, time having expired, it is 
	ORDERED by the Court that the aforesaid petition be denied.

Per Curiam

United States Court of Appeals                                          FOR THE COURT:
for the District of Columbia
											 George A. Fisher
Filed Aug. 5, 1981                                                                     Clerk
										BY:
George A. Fisher                                                        /s/ Robert A. Bonner
      Clerk                                                             Chief Deputy Clerk

Chief Judge Robinson would grant the petition for extension of time to file for a 
rehearing en banc to and including August 31, 1981 only.        







p. 182                                          1d


OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543


										   July 2, 1981


Mr. Garry Davis
3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016

				Re:  Garry Davis v. Immigration Director
					Immigration and Naturalization Service
					A-10889


Dear Mr. Davis:

	Your application for an extension of time in which to file a petition for a 
writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case has been presented tot he  Chief 
Justice who, on July 1, 1981, signed an order extending your time to and including 
August 28, 1981.

	A copy of the Chief Justice's order is enclosed.

						Very truly yours,

						By

						/s/ Katherine Downs
						Assistant Clerk


sd
Enc.
cc (letter only):
					Honorable Lawrence G. Wallace
					Acting Solicitor General
					George A. Fisher, Esq., Clerk
					U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit
					(Your No. 80-1071)








p. 183                                          1e

1f



		CONSULAT
		  DE  LA
REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE MAURITANIE

	   POUR LA SUISSE
		GENEVA





								World Service
								Authority

								4002 Basel
									 (Suisse)





								Genäve, 1e 28 Juil, 1975



Dear Sirs,

In reply to your recent documentation in respect of W.S.A. passports I wish to 
specify that its recognition will be granted in the framework of Mauritanian 
laws.  If Mauritanian laws and prescriptions are respected those passports may 
come into profit of visas for entry in Mauritania.

The allowance of a Mauritanian visa will however remain under the competence 
of the respective Mauritanian Representation of the circumscription, in my case 
for Switzerland.

								Yours faithfully,


								/s/P. Buttler, Consul




						



						184



						2f

MISSION PERMANENTE DE HAUTE VOLTA
	AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES





			(written in French - dated 24 October1972)





						185





				








		






		
		
		













					3f

	

						



								PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
								      REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

									April 19, 1973


The Coordinating Director
World Service Authority
4002
Switzerland

Dear Sir,


	I have the honour to refer to your recent letter under cover of which you 
forwarded a specimen copy of the second edition of the WSA Passport for approval 
by competent authorities of my Government.

	I am pleased to inform you that my Government has recognised and 
accepted the Passport as a genuine and valid travel document of identity.

								Hours faithfully

								/s/ T.C. Kapome

								For: Charge d'Affaires a.l.

















						186


						4f


EMBAJADA DEL ECUADOR
WASHINGTON


						August 5, 1954



United World Service Authority
270 Park Ave, Suite C-1315
New York 17, N.Y.
	
Mr. Gary Davis, Director

Gentlemen,

	Further to your letter of July 15,  regarding passports to be used by 
refugees and stateless persons, we are now in receipt of the views of my 
Government on your ideas about the use of the proposed document for 
international identification.

	Ecuador has always given cooperation and assistance to refugees and 
stateless persons, by giving them special travel documents which have been 
accepted by other countries.  My Government believes that your idea is 
interesting and, providing all requirements are complied with and security 
maintained, Ecuador would accept such documents for purposes of being  used 
instead of a passport.

	Furthermore, my Government believes that if our office decides to open an 
office in Ecuador for legal and security reasons, you must include among the 
directors of said office a Representative of the Ecuadorian Government from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs..

	In summary, Ecuador accepts your world passport as travel document for 
personal identification.

							Yours very sincerely,



							/s/Dr. Josä R. Chiriboga V,
							Ambassador of Ecuador






						187

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543



								October 19, 1981



Mr. Garry Davis
303 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016




				Re:     Garry Davis
					v. District Director, Immigration and
					Naturalization Service
					No. 81-427



Dear Mr. Davis:


   The Court today entered the following order in the above entitled 
case:
	The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.


						Very truly yours,

						/s/ Alexander L/ Stevas, Clerk














































7
8 
9 
10 
11   The last embarkation point from which petitioner arrived on May 13, 1977 was 
Heathrow Airport, UK.  In that the British Home Office had already imprisoned petitioner 
for 12 weeks in 1953 as a "menace to the public good," arranging for his deportation in 
collusion with U.S. Immigration, he could not be returned to the UK.
12   Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1st p. (App. C).
13   See Memorandum, App. 2b.
14   The aforementioned forced entry-- July 27, 1953-- illustrates in an ominous way the 
frustrations of both the executive and judicial branches of the government in trying to 
reconcile the inconsistencies represented by the statutes here in question.  For instance, 
should petitioner depart from the United States-- "deporting" himself (See 8 USC 1101(g)) 
and return, will the INS take him into arbitrary custody (See Marcia-Nir v. Smith, C81-
1084A, D.C. Atlanta) , waive the visa requirements or as now again "exclude" him legally 
if not actually?
15   "A 'foreign state' with former section 17 of this title...providing for expatriation of 
American citizenwho was naturalized under laws of foreign state was a country which was 
not the United States or its possessions or colony, an alien country, other than our own."  
Kletter v. Dulles, D.C. D.C. 1953, III F,Supp. 593,.  "In act providing for loss of United 
States nationality by participation in political election in 'foreign state' quoted words are 
not word of art, and in using them Congress did not have in mind fine distinctions as to 
sovereignty of occupied and unoccupied countries which authorities on international law 
may have formulated, but when Congress speaks of 'foreign state' it means a 'country' 
which is not the United States or its possession or colony,  'an alien country', 'other than 
our own'...."  Hichino Uyeno v. Acheson,  D.C. Wash. 96 F.Supp. 510, 515.  (See also Bigley 
v. New York & P.R.S.S. Co., 105 F. 74, 76;  Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 521, 10 AM Dec. 
179;  Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 US 1, 15, 5  Pet. 1, 15, 88 Ed. 25;  Cowell v. 
State, 16 Tex.App. 57, 61;  Faber v. United States, 157 F. 140, 141;  Bezat v. Home Owners' 
Loan Corp., 98 P.2d 852, 855, 55 Ariz.;  Kuniyuki v. Acheson, D.C. Wash., 94 F.Supp. 358, 
360).
16   22 USC 292 provides:
	People v. Pierce, 41 N.Y. S.  858, 860, 18 mis 83.
16a  ion to the International Court at the Hague seeking judicial redress.
17   In the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the Vaschenko and Chmykhalov families, .
18   "The law of nations is 'part of our law'."  Hilton v. Guyot, N.Y. 1895, 16 S.Ct. 
139, 159, US 163, 40 L.Ed. 95.
19   "By what right (does one treat) a foreign state as a sort of sewer into which 
Preuss.                                        
20   Human Rights and World Public Order, 135, McDougal, Lassell, Chen, Yale 
University Press, 1980.
21   
22      3rd Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, UN Document, 1953.
23   "Nationality is a concept created in the past to promote a minimum organization of the 
Press, 1980.
24   "...Everyman has a right to live somewhere on the earth."  Thomas Jefferson, 1801 
presidential address.
25 "The notion that states are the only appropriate 'subjects' of international law is belied by 
	Human Rights and World Public Order,  p. 178.
26   "I	"The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."  Art. 21(3), 
U.D.H.R.
 28/"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his s.
29/"In my faith, the American concept of man's dignity does not comport with making even 
Dulles,  Note 33, 643, E. Warren, CJ.
30/By elementary reasoning, if the people are sovereign, as inferred in both the Ninth and 
humankind itself.
31/"The Constitution of the state and the nation recognize unenumerated rights of natural 
230.

1/Each subdivision under 8 U.S.C. par. 1481(a) represents a separateand independent 
process that leads to expatriation.  These subdivision are independly self-executing; a 
citizen satisfying the provisions of one subsection may be expatriated pursuant to tht 
provision. 
2/See, e.g., Nishiwaka v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 136 (1958) ("Unless voluntariness is put in 
issue, the Goernment makes its case simply by proing the objective expatriating 
act.");Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958) ("Congress can attach loss of citizenship 
only as a consequence of conduct engaged in voluntarily"); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 
U.S. 491, 502 (1950) (voluntarines, despite congrary intent, sufficient to uphold 
expatriation).
3/See United States v. Matheson, 532 F. 2d 809, 814 (2d Cir.) (interpret AfroyimI to 
require subjective intent), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976);42 Op. Att'y Gen. 397 (1969) 
(Afroyim leaves open to individual petitioner whether to raise issue of intent).

4/These circumstanes occur when intent is not at issue. The question of intent will 
seldomberaised in adjudicating seveal types of expatriation.  See 3 C. Gordon &H. 
Rosenfield, Immigration Law &Procedure 20.8b at 20-61-62 (2979 ed.) (subjectiveintent 
normally irrelevant to expatritionbased on acquisition of another nationality and 
voluntary renunciation of citizenship). In these casesthe courtneed only 
examinevoluntainess.  However, where, ashere, he question of intent is raised b 
thepetitioner, we believe it is appropriate to examine intent. 
5/¨(T)he citizen's voluntary abandonment of his citizenship apparently will be effectuated 
if accomplished in compliance with law, even though statelessness may result." Gordon, 
The Citizen and the State, 53 Geo. L.J. 315, 36061 (1965). 
6/This finding answers the objection raised in the Jolley dissent.  Judge Rives dissented 
there because, inter alia, he was unsure whether the petitioner intended statelessness.  
Herein, statelessness was the calculated result of the petitioner's actions.


7/The petitioner's contention tht Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
requires the acquisition of another nationality to  uphold expatriation is without merit.  
The Univesal Declaration of Human Rights is a United Nations Document.  3 U.N. Doc. 
a/810 (1948).  It is well established that the United Nations Charter does not supersede 
United States law. See, e.g. Haiti v. Immigration and NturaliztionService,  343 F.2d 466, 
468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965);Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F2d 398, 400 
(I7th Cr. 1959).
	The petitioner's argument based on Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights fails for the same reason.
8/The petitioner raised for the first  time at oral argument the theory that the Privileges 
and Immunities Cluase of theConstitution, Article IV, Section 2, allows thepetitioner to 
enter and reamin in h United Sates by virtue of being a citizen of Maine. This argument, 
though nvel, fails to take acount ofCongressional power to establish nationalit laws.
	The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Arlticle IV, Section 2, serves to prevent one 
sate from discriminating against another state.  Article I, Selction 8 of thcostitution 
establishes that "Congress shall have power...To establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturliztion."  This Constitutional mandate empowrs Congress to define "the process 
through which citiznship is acquired or lost," to determine"the criteria by which 
citizenship si judged," and to fix "the consequences citizenship or noncitizenship entail."  
L.Tribe, AmericanConstitutional Law 277 (1978).
	these two constitutional provisions are not in conflict: a state may not discriminate 
againt a citizen of anothe state, by, for example, restricting travel or access, but Congress 
has the power to determine the standards by which a person lacking the satus of United 
States citizen shall enter and remiain in theUnited States.  Because Congress has detemine 
that an alien must possess a proper document of entry to enter and reamin in this country, 
the petitioner must eithe obtain a proper visa or be subjected to deportation.


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